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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Medicare is a federal health insurance program created in 1965 for all people age
65 and older, certain younger people with disabilities, and people with end-stage renal
disease, regardless of income or medical history. Medicare now covers over 50 million
Americans. In 2013, Medicare spending was $585 billion, a 6.17% increase from $551 in
2012 (Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Medicare Baseline May 2013, April 2014), and
accounted for 16.7% of total federal spending and 21% of total national health spending.
Medicare spending is expected to continue growing due to an aging population and the
rising costs of health care per person.
Medicare offers all enrollees a defined benefit with four different parts that help
cover specific services. Part A, also called hospital insurance, covers inpatient services
provided by hospitals as well as skilled nursing and hospice care, and accounted for 47%
of benefit spending in 2013. Part B, also called medical insurance, covers services
provided by physicians and other practitioners, hospitals’ outpatient departments, and
suppliers of medical equipment, and accounted for 42.9% of benefit spending in 2012.
Part A and Part B together are called traditional Medicare, which is run by the
government. The MMA of 2003 added a voluntary prescription drug benefit beginning in
2006 under Part D, and 10.6% of Medicare spending now goes toward the Part D drug
benefit. Last but not least is Medicare Part C, also called the Medicare Advantage Plan,
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offered by private companies that contract with Medicare to provide all Part A and Part B
benefits, as well as prescription drug coverage.
The Medicare program currently provides two distinct choices to beneficiaries: a
government-run traditional Medicare (TM) plan, sometimes called Medicare fee-forservice, and a private health plan known as Medicare Advantage (MA). Medicare
Advantage plans originated with the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA)
as managed health care. The first MA plan was available to Medicare beneficiaries in 1985.
Since then, MA plan enrollment has grown rapidly, leading to higher penetration rate and
more competition among health care providers. This program has gone by several names
over the past 30 years. It was first introduced as Part C (compared to Part A and Part B in
Medicare). Then the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 renamed it “Medicare+Choice.”
Next the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 renamed it “Medicare Advantage
(MA).” Currently, MA includes health maintenance organization (HMOs) plans, local
preferred provider organization (LPPOs) plans, regional preferred provider organization
(RPPOs) plans, private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, special needs plans (SNPS), and several
other plans. The HMO plans, PPO plans and SNP plans are together called Medicare
Advantage Coordinated Care Plans (CCPs), because they all offer health care through an
established provider network approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS).
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Improving hospital quality has always been an important goal for policy makers.
As a rapidly growing and relatively new program, the quality of MA plans as compared to
traditional Medicare program has been studied by many health economists in recent
years. Studies not only measured the quality of the MA plan itself, but also how the
development of the MA program affects patients under traditional Medicare and even
with private insurance. Patients covered by MA plans and TM plans are treated in the
same hospitals, using the same medical equipment, and by the same physicians. Thus to
accurately evaluate the rapidly expanding MA enrollment, we should not only measure
the quality of hospital care received by MA enrollees, but also the quality of hospital care
received by patients under TM plans.
This dissertation evaluates some of the indirect effects, known as “spillover
effects,” of the expansion of MA plans on the quality of care delivered to those who
remain with traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare. More specifically, I examine the
spillover effects related to how the expansion of managed care changes the
characteristics and delivery of hospital care, e.g., the quality of care received, by those
traditional FFS beneficiaries, while keeping all other variables constant (Chernew et al.,
2008). Most previous studies have examined the spillover effect based on the cost of care,
and it is widely accepted that higher managed care penetration can lead to less Medicare
expenditure. Little is known, however, about the effect of the expansion of managed care
on the quality of hospital care received by traditional Medicare beneficiaries.
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Though lower health care expenditure is one goal of Medicare reforms,
researchers and policy makers worry about whether reducing medical expenditures will
reduce the quality of health care. Reduction in spending for patients may be the result of
reducing services. If those services were necessary for good health, the quality of care will
decline. Alternatively, the quality of care might rise in low expenditure areas if the
spending reductions result from reducing unnecessary or inappropriate services. It is
urgently important to determine whether spillover effects are related to quality, and if so,
how.
In recent years, the government has been revising the policies related to MA plans,
especially to the program’s structure and plan payment methods, not only to improve the
availability of private plans, ease of plan enrollment, and reducing unnecessary
expenditures, but also to improve the quality of health care. For example, the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has been trying to adopt a different payment
approach for managed care to reduce Medicare expenditures, as well as encourage more
enrollments. CMS is also paying more attention to care quality by rewarding hospitals
that deliver higher quality and higher value health care. As part of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA), CMS also began in October 2012 to penalize hospitals with excess readmissions (as
measured by dividing a hospital’s number of “predicted” 30-day readmissions for heart
attack, heart failure, and pneumonia by the number “expected,” based on an average
hospital with similar patients). Thus it is extremely important to evaluate the direct and
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indirect impact of the expansion of MA plans on the quality of hospital care, in order to
design a more efficient MA program.
Considering that reducing readmission can simultaneously improve quality and
reduce cost, I will use the readmission rate as the measurement of quality. Some
readmissions may be unavoidable because of patient- and community-level factors
outside the hospital’s control. However some readmissions could be avoided by the use
of more advanced equipment and more experienced physicians, or by coordinating timely
follow-up care. Those preventable readmissions may result from a medical error or
adverse event during hospitalization, or the lack of efficient follow-up care or accurate
communication following treatments. Readmission rate is thus a logical indicator to
measure the quality of hospitals.
This study will address the need for more empirical evidence on quality
performance in relation to the MA plans’ penetration during the period of 2006 to 2009.
Specifically, I examine whether there is a spillover effect from the penetration of
Coordinated Care Plans (CCPs) on the traditional fee-for-service sector, by using the 30day readmission rate as the hospital quality indicator. Because managed care penetration
is potentially endogenous, I use county-level payment rates from CMS to managed care
plans as instruments. Using recent data, I found a substantial spillover effect from the
expansion of managed care plans that will increase the quality of inpatient care received
by traditional fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries.
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In this paper, section 2 provides background on the development of Medicare
Advantage plans. Section 3 is a brief review of prior studies of the spillover effect of
managed care. In section 4, I develop an econometric model to determine the
relationship between quality and MA penetration. In section 5, I introduce the data
resource and explain the model, and also develop my hypotheses on the relationship
between MA plans’ penetration, as well as the competition and quality of traditional FFS.
Section 6 presents the empirical analysis and solves related issues. Section 7 is the
conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
In 1965, Congress created Medicare to provide health insurance to people age 65
and older, regardless of income or medical history. Since then, the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS) administer Medicare, and has contracted with private
insurance companies to behave like intermediaries between the government and medical
providers. Since the 1970s, Medicare beneficiaries have had the option to enroll in private
health plans (at first, only health maintenance organizations [HMOs]), as an alternative to
the federally administered traditional Medicare program. Traditional Medicare has lower
administrative costs and offers enrollees an unconstrained choice of health care providers,
but it lacks incentives to coordinate care and encourage providers to provide higher
quality care (e.g., lower readmission rate and mortality rate) (MedPAC, 2014).
The MA program was introduced in the hope that managed care in Medicare
could be more efficient with lower cost and higher quality, considering the success of
managed care in the commercial insurance market. To attract more enrollees while
reducing costs (which has been proved to be hard to arrive), MA payment policy has
evolved since the program first originated with the TEFRA 1982. The average MA
payment increased from $250 in 1990 to more than $800 in 2014, and could be as high as
$1,500 around 2010 (see Figure 1). This payment increase during the last three decades
not only relates to increasing health care costs, but is closely related to CMS payment
policies, because CMS wants to use MA payment structure and program parameters as an
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efficient tool to directly affect MA plans and enrollees and may indirectly affect the entire
health care system. Much of the rationale for the current MA program is based on the
premise that MA plans can provide care of higher quality and lower costs than the TM
system, and that this efficiency will enable more generous benefits at a lower premium,
which can finally reduce government deficit at healthcare spending.
Prior to the passage of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, Medicare used formal risk
adjustment, setting a per-member per-month payment for each beneficiary. MA plans
were paid by a capitation set at 95 percent of expected Fee-for-Service (FFS) spending in
the beneficiaries’ county, for the purpose of reducing cost compared to TM plans.
However, this 5% lower payment than FFS did not save the government money. Instead,
the government lost money due to adverse selection: the plans attracted enrollees who
were considerably healthier than the average Medicare enrollee (Nicholas, 2009; CMS
1999). Despite paying plans only 95 percent of the beneficiary’s expected costs, adverse
selection in Part C resulted in an estimated 5 to 7 percent overpayment (CMS 1999).
To reduce overpayments to Medicare Advantage plans, increase choices available
to Medicare beneficiaries, and address perceived regional inequities caused by payment
rates, the Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) and introduced a new
payment regime. The BBA broke the direct link between the growth in county fee-forservice spending and Medicare managed care payment, and the plans were paid the
highest of three annual rates per beneficiary per month: (1) a minimum floor payment
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that began at $367 in1998 and was to be adjusted annually (floor rate was increased by
its estimate of the current year’s national growth rate of Medicare fee-for-service
spending, minus a statutory reduction of 0.5 percentage point through 2002); (2) a 2
percent increase from the county’s prior year rate; or (3) a blend of county-specific and
national average rates, if a so-called budget-neutrality condition was met (MedPAC 1999;
Nicholas, 2009; McGuire et al., 2013). The blended payment for a county is a weighted
average of the adjusted updated local rates and the input price adjusted national rate.
To satisfy the budget neutrality condition in a particular year, the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA, now called CMS) compared the projected total
Medicare+Choice spending, if county rates were based on the highest of the floor,
minimum update, or blended rates, with the payment based on local rates only. This
requires that total Medicare+Choice spending, including blended payments, equals what
would be paid if only local rates had been used. If projected total spending was not equal
to projected spending based on local rates, HCFA would multiply the blended amounts by
a factor to satisfy the budget neutrality condition. The blended rate was designed to
reduce the variation in payments across the country by lowering the highest rates and
increasing the lowest rates.
During this period, Medicare continued to lose money on those beneficiaries who
enrolled in MA plans. On the one hand, for those non-floor counties that do not apply
floor payment, the 2 percent cap on payment increases effectively decreased Part C
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reimbursement. On the other hand, Medicare paid more for Part C enrollees in any floor
county. Because the growth in spending in the FFS Medicare program over that period
was higher than 2 percent, more counties were considered as floor counties. In 1998,
when there was one national floor, only 12 percent of beneficiaries lived in floor counties.
While in 2001, after the introduction of a higher urban floor for counties within
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with at least 250,000 people, 46 percent of
Medicare beneficiaries lived in floor counties. This updated floor payment rule increased
the health plans’ overpayment. What was worse, to keep hospitals and doctors in their
networks, the plans had to pay market rates. As a result, those counties that applied the 2
percent cap reduced the number of plans. The MC program was thus not successful in
expanding plan option choice to Medicare beneficiaries in general, and the BBA was not
successful in bringing new choices to areas that had lacked Medicare risk plans.
To solve the problem of decreasing plan participation and declining enrollment in
MA plans, the Republican-led congress passed the 2003 Medicare Modernization and
Improvement Act (MMA), effective March 2004, to increase payments across all areas.
Under MMA, Medicare calculated a benchmark based on the highest of four amounts: (1)
an urban or rural floor payment; (2) 100 percent of risk-adjusted traditional Medicare FFS
spending in the county (calculated using a five-year moving average lagged three years);
(3) a minimum update over the prior year rate of 2 percent or traditional Medicare’s
national expenditure growth rate, whichever was greater; or (4) a blended payment rate
update (McGuire et al., 2013).
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Since 2006, the MMA started a bidding process for plan payment. Private plans
submit bids indicating the per capita payment for which they are willing to offer Part A
and Part B coverage to Medicare beneficiaries. Plan payment rates are determined by the
MA plan “bid” and the “benchmark” in the payment area. Benchmark, which is the
maximum amount of Medicare payment set by law for an MA plan to provide Part A and
Part B benefits, varies depending on the counties the plans serve and where they draw
their enrollment. Counties called “floor” counties are given higher benchmarks to
increase plan availability and have benchmarks that average 120 percent of FFS spending.
For non-floor counties, benchmarks are set at an average 112 percent of FFS spending
(Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 2009).
There are two payment floors: a general floor applicable to all counties, and a
higher “urban” floor, which applies to counties in metropolitan areas with more than
250,000 residents. If a plan’s bid was greater than the county-level benchmark, enrollees
were required to pay a monthly premium which equals the difference between the
benchmark and the bid price. If the bid was lower, 75 percent of the difference was to be
returned to enrollees in the form of supplemental benefits, the other 25 percent was
returned to the Medicare program (McGuire et al.,2013; KFF, 2012). Because benchmarks
are often set above the cost for Medicare to provide benefits to similar beneficiaries in
the FFS program, MA payment rates usually exceed FFS spending. The Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission (MedPAC) reports that, on average (weighted by plan enrollment by
county to estimate overall averages and average by plan type), 2010 MA benchmarks will
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be 117 percent of spending in Medicare’s traditional FFS programs, bids will be 104
percent of FFS spending, and payments will be 113 percent of FFS spending.
In response to the MA payment levels being significantly above traditional
Medicare, the 2010 health reform, known as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (PPACA), gradually phases down Medicare plan payments to bring them closer to the
average costs of Medicare beneficiaries. Plan payment rates are still determined by the
MA plan bid and the payment area’s benchmark. Under PPACA, MA benchmarks for 2011
were frozen at 2010 levels for each county. Beginning in 2012, benchmarks began to
transition to a system in which each county’s benchmark will be a certain percentage in
2017. Specifically, for counties in the quartile with the lowest FFS costs, benchmarks will
be 115 percent of fee-for-service costs per enrollee. For counties in the quartile with the
highest FFS costs, benchmarks will be 95 percent of fee-for-service costs per enrollee
(MedPAC 2011). The transition from old benchmarks will be complete by 2017, at which
time the average base payment will be about 101.5 percent of FFS.
Along with the different payment policies to MA plans, enrollment in Medicare
Advantage plans is closely related to the size of the payment. Total MA enrollment has
expanded rapidly over the past three decades (see Figure 2). At the 1985 launch of the
Medicare HMO program, only 2% of beneficiaries enrolled, but the number enrolled in
MA plans increased steadily until the M+C program was adopted as part of the BBA of
1997. After 1997, growth in enrollment in managed care plans slowed to a maximum 6.3
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million enrollees in 1999. Enrollment continued to decline by about 27% by 2003 when
new Medicare policies came into effective to encourage more participation in MA plans.
These policies boosted federal funding to stabilize and expand the program, and in 2006
introduced Medicare drug benefits and authorized regional MA plans. Since then, MA
plans have become more attractive because of the convenience of a single plan covering
all Medicare benefits, a cap on out-of-pocket spending, and an effective information
campaign. In 2013, 14.5 million, or 28 percent, of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in a
Medicare Advantage plan, an increase of about 1 million over 2012 enrollments. This
number is projected to increase slowly to 25 million beneficiaries by 2024 (CBO, April
2014).
Since 2006, MA enrollment has doubled (see Figure 3), and plans project overall
enrollment growth in 2014 of 3 to 5 percent (MedPAC 2014). In recent years, the share of
enrollees under HMO plans has increased slowly, while the number of Medicare
Advantage enrollees in both local and regional PPOs has grown rapidly, and enrollees in
PFFS plans first increased rapidly then rapidly shrinking after 2010. In 2013, enrollment in
HMO plans increased by 10%, to nearly 10 million enrollees, enrollment in local PPO plans
grew about 11% to 3.3 million enrollees, and enrollment in regional PPO plans increase by
16% to 1.1 million enrollees. This strong growing trend does not apply to PFFS in recent
years. With fewer limitations than other MA plans impose on doctors and hospitals (such
as no network restrictions), PFFS was extremely attractive to beneficiaries, especially
among Medicare recipients who travel frequently. However since 2011, PFFS plans have
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generally been required to establish networks, a change that makes PFFS less attractive to
Medicare beneficiaries and led to a sharp decline in PFFS enrollment.
Differences in the enrollment and growth trends of the four most popular MA
plans result from different regulations and requirements by CMS. HMO enrollees must
generally get non-emergency care and services from doctors or hospitals in the plan's
network, and they require a referral from their primary care doctor to see a specialist. If
they are treated out-of-network, they must pay all or most of the costs.
To reduce the restrictions patients must meet for HMO plans and make health
care more convenient, PFFS and local PPO were authorized in the BBA 1997, while
regional PPO was added into the MA family in MMA 2003 and was first available to
enrollees in 2006. Compared to HMOs, PPO plans are more flexible; no primary care
physician is required. Out-of-network services, however, are charged at a higher out-ofpocket cost than in-network services. PFFS did not require a provider network, so
beneficiaries are free to choose any doctor, but Medicare providers may refuse to treat
them, constraining beneficiary access to services. The Medicare Improvements for
Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), required as of 2011 that all employersponsored PFFS plans have a network of contracted providers for enrollees in each county
of operation, while allowed enrollees to ask other providers if they will accept PFFS
payment.
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The expansion of enrollment in MA plans provides the incentive to encourage
insurance companies and managed care plans to contract with CMS to offer Medicare
Advantage plans in specific geographic areas (see Figure 4). As of February 2014, there
were 571 MA contracts, including 556 local Coordinated Care Plans (CCPs, including HMO,
local PPO and SNPs or Special Needs Plans) contracts, and 12 PFFS contracts. The increase
in the number of contracts in recent years increases the overall plan availability. Since
2006, virtually all Medicare beneficiaries have had access to at least one Medicare
Advantage plan (see Figure 5). In 2014, 95 percent of beneficiaries had access to networkbased local CCPs, 71 percent had access to a regional PPO, and only 53 percent had
access to a PFFS plan. From 2007 to 2010, all beneficiaries, whether in rural or urban
areas, had access to at least one PFFS plan. This declined to 63 percent in 2011 when the
network building requirement was applied, and continued to decrease between 2013 and
2014, from 59 to 53 percent of beneficiaries.
Generally, HMOs, local PPOs and regional PPOs are classified as coordinated care
plans (CCPs) because they all include a network of providers contracted to deliver the
benefit package approved by CMS to ensure all requirements are met, including access,
availability, and quality. PFFS plans are not classified as CCPs because originally they did
not have provider networks. In this research, I divide Medicare Advantage plans into two
parts: CCPs that require a network of providers, and PFFS that do not require a network.
The spillover effect of the expansion of CCPs and PFFS will be evaluated in the following
sections.
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, I first review the mechanisms through which spillovers may be
occurring, and then review the existing literature examining the spillover effects of the
expansion of managed care on the quality of patients enrolled in traditional FFS plans.
Lastly, I will review the limitations of present literature and the contribution of my
dissertation.
3.1 Mechanisms of Spillover Effects
Some researchers point out that the expansion of managed care plans may
negatively impact the care of traditional FFS enrollees through the following mechanisms:
First, greater managed care market share may make it more difficult to access
hospital care due to high demand and short-run inelastic supply. An unsatisfactory
performance on process-of-care measures, which record the percentage of patients who
receive appropriate care for specific conditions, is usually considered an indicator of low
quality hospital care. Litaker et al. (2003), in a 1998 cross-sectional survey of households,
found that individuals residing in areas with more managed care were 28% more likely to
report problems obtaining care than those living elsewhere.
Second, spillover effects may occur through a negative impact on the investment
in infrastructures, such as the density of hospitals, beds or available services over time,
and the adoption of advanced medical technology. HMO providers are often assumed to
have highly elastic demand, so high managed care penetration will force managed care
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providers to compete with each other, which makes HMO plans successful in negotiating
lower prices with providers (Baker and Phibbs, 2002). Furthermore, lower prices require
managed care providers to reduce cost, most likely by reducing the number of specialists,
and thereby the number of specialists’ services provided (Baker 2001; Heidenreich et al.
2002); by encouraging more conservative practice patterns (Baker 2001); or by slowing
the timing of adopting more advanced but costly technologies (Culter and Sheiner 1998;
Baker 2001). Because hospitals’ resources are shared by all patients, both managed care
beneficiaries and traditional FFS enrollees, fewer advanced technologies not only affects
the quality of managed care plans, but also patients under traditional FFS plans.
For example, Chernew (1995) used Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)
data from 1982 and 1987, and showed that a 10 percent increase in the non-IPA HMO
penetration rate leads to a 4.8 percent to 5.6 percent drop in beds per capita. Baker and
Wheeler (1998) find that high HMO market share is associated with low levels of MRI
availability, by using data from a nationwide census of 3,705 MRI sites conducted by
Technology Marketing Group (TMG) in late 1994 and early 1995. Mas and Seinfeld (2008)
reveiwed annual data from 5,390 U.S. hospitals from 1982-95 regarding the adoption of
13 different technologies, and found that managed care has a negative effect on hospitals’
acquisition for each of the 13 medical technologies.
Third, higher managed care penetration may discourage high quality hospitals
from entering the Medicare market. Gold, Hurley, Lake, et al. (1995) surveyed 138
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managed care plans by telephone, found a careful selection of physicians by all plans, and
concluded that managed care plans have complex systems for selecting, paying, and
monitoring their physicians. Based on this conclusion, Mukamel, et al. (2001) deduced
that as managed care takes more market share, plans have the power to place financial
and administrative burdens on providers, which may lead high-quality providers to find it
less profitable to stay in the FFS market because of lower market share, or accept HMO
beneficiaries because of lower prices reimbursements. High-quality providers may thus
leave such a managed-care dominated market, and their selective exit would affect the
quality of medical care of both managed care and traditional Medicare patients.
On the other hand, as most recent researchers have found, a higher managed care
penetration rate is more likely to have a positive spillover effect on the quality of health
care received by fee-for-service patients through the practice patterns mechanism.
Managed care can influence physicians’ practice patterns, because of different payment
methods from traditional Medicare patients. As practice patterns changes, they are likely
to apply to across all patients, even if the changes are responses to managed care
incentives. For example, as Glied and Zivin (2002) pointed out by using the data from the
1993-1996 National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS), more than 25 percent of
traditional FFS patients were treated by physicians with more than 20% of patients
covered by Medicare HMO plans. Similarly, the average Medicare HMO patient visited a
physician whose patient panel was over one-fourth traditional FFS. With proper
regression models, they concluded that physicians who treat mostly HMO patients
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appear to adopt an equivalent practice style along most measurable dimensions (like
duration of visit, number of tests and medications ordered, and scheduling of return
visits).
Spillovers may also occur in the opposite way through the adoption of technology.
Increased HMO penetration will increase the insurer’s ability to obtain better quality
information about providers for its enrollees. In another paper, Glied (2000) pointed out
that managed care plans must have the capacity to collect and transfer administrative
data within an internal market. This information collection capacity gives hospitals the
incentive to increase quality in order to attract customers. Baker and Phibbs (2002)
analyzed hospital development of neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) using data from
the American Hospital Association surveys 1980 to 1996 (except 1981 when no survey
was conducted), and concluded that higher HMO market share will lead to slower
adoption of mid-level care units, but not affect the adoption of the most advanced highlevel units. More patients will benefit from advanced technology equipment because they
do not have the choice but to use more expensive but more effective technology.
3.2 Managed Care Penetration Affects the Traditional FFS Sector
A large amount of empirical literature seeks to test the relative performance of
MA and TM, considering the fast growth of MA plans in recent years. The most recent
study supports the hypothesis that MA plans have been outperforming TM plans. Because
Medicare beneficiaries, whether enrolled in MA plans or TM plans, will share the same
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hospitals and be treated by the same doctors, the question remains whether the higher
quality of MA will spill over into the traditional Medicare sector. The spillover effect from
MA plans has been widely studied since the first HMO plan became available in 1985. It
was an especially hot topic in the 1990’s, when the government decided to continue
supporting Medicare Advantage plans, leading to an expansion of MA plans. There are
essentially two approaches to measure this spillover effect: expenditure and quality.
3.2.1 Spillover Effect on System-Wide Expenditures
Much literature examines the spillovers between managed care plans (mostly
HMOs) and "system-wide expenditures," (expenditures in all sectors of the health care
system, including Medicare and non-Medicare (Baker 1997). The evidence for managed
care penetration affecting system-wide expenditures is consistent; most studies conclude
that increased HMO penetration is associated with decreased overall hospital spending.
Little or no evidence suggests that more enrollments in managed care increase spending
(Baker 2003). Gaskin and Hadley (1997) researched all nonfederal hospitals in the 84
largest MSAs in the country from 1985-1993, and found that hospitals in areas with high
rates of HMO penetration had a slower rate of expense growth (8.3%) than hospitals in
low penetration areas (11.2%).
3.2.2 Spillover Effect on Medicare-Specific Expenditures
Meanwhile, a number of studies examine evidence of the spillover effects of HMO
penetration on Medicare-specific expenditures, mostly the expenditure of traditional FFS
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beneficiaries. Baker (1997) analyzed 1986-1990 county- and MSA- (metropolitan
statistical area) level data, and found that Medicare FFS expenditure has a concave
relationship with managed care market share, reaching a maximum at HMO market share
between 0% and 10% and decreasing thereafter. Another study by Baker (1999) found an
increase in HMO market share from 10 to 20% will decrease Medicare FFS expenditures
of Part A by 2% and Part B by 1.5%. Using data from the annual Cost and Use ﬁles of the
Medicare Current Beneﬁciary Survey (MCBS) for 1994–2001, Chernew, DeCicca and Town
(2008) conducted instrumental variable models to correct for the endogeneity of HMO
penetration changes across counties, and found that a 1% point increase in county-level
Medicare HMO penetration is associated with a nearly 1% reduction in individual-level
annual spending by fee-for-service enrollees.
As it becomes widely accepted that higher managed care penetration can lead to
lower Medicare expenditure, both researchers and policy makers are concerned that
reduced medical expenditures will reduce the quality of health care. Because Medicare’s
prices are set administratively, reductions in spending on patients must result from a
decrease in services. If reduced services are necessary, quality of care will decline.
Alternatively, quality of care might improve in low expenditure areas if reduced spending
results from reductions in unnecessary or inappropriate services. Thus it is important and
urgent to determine the spillover effect, not only by measuring expenditures, but also by
measuring quality.
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3.2.3 Spillover Effect on System-Wide Quality
To resolve this issue and fill the knowledge gap, the spillover effect of the
expansion of managed care on the quality of health care has been extensively discussed
in recent years. Unlike measuring expenditures, measuring quality in the health care
sector is extremely difficult, mainly because quality has numerous dimensions. No single
variable can capture all the factors to measure the quality of each hospital.
Instead, three criteria have been used by previous researchers to measure quality
(Sari, 2002): (1) input quality as measured by the number of specialists, adoption of
specific technologies like MRI, and hospital staffing levels (Kaestner and Guardado, 2008);
(2) process quality as measured by number of tests performed, access to care, admissions
for conditions that could be prevented through timely and effective treatment (Nicholas,
2009), and length of visit times with physicians (Decker 2007); and (3) outcome quality as
measured by effectiveness of care, patients’ satisfaction with care (Hellinger, 1998; Shen
and Zuckerman, 2005; Brunt and Jensen, 2012), readmission rates, and mortality rates
(Mukamel et al., 2001).
Some literature tests the impact of managed care penetration on system-wide
quality, but conclusions about the effect of managed care penetration on the quality of
care in the early literature are mixed. Blendon et al. (1998) found in 1997 survey data that
45 percent of Americans believe managed care decreased the quality of care they
received. Mobley and Magnussen (2002) examined how managed care penetration
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affected hospital efficiency by using excess staffing in California hospitals in 1995 as the
quality indicator, but they did not find a significant relationship between managed care
penetration and nurse staffing ratios. Using national birth certificate data for 1996,
Hueston and Sutton (2000) found HMO penetration was unlikely to influence national
cesarean section rates.
Escarce et al. (2006) used six medical conditions as quality indicators in California,
New York, and Wisconsin from 1994 to 1999, and found that higher HMO penetration
was associated with lower mortality rates in California but higher mortality rates in New
York. Baker and McClellan (2001) analyzed a cohort of newly diagnosed cancer patients in
1992–94 (derived from Medicare claims files), and concluded that managed care is
associated with increased diagnosis rates, which could indicate better screening and
better preventive care, usually indicators of higher quality.
3.2.4 Spillover Effect on the Quality of Medicare
Due to limited data, only a small amount of literature provides evidence that
managed care can influence the care provided to individuals in fee-for-service plans
through a spillover mechanism. Mukamel et al. (2001) used 1990 data from 1,927
hospitals in 134 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with five or more acute-care
hospitals to investigate the associations between HMO market penetration, HMO
competition, and the quality of care received by Medicare fee-for-service patients. In
their study, risk-adjusted expected mortality rates are used to measure the quality of
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each hospital’s service. They claim that HMO penetration is negatively associated with 30day post-admission mortality rate.
Heidenreich et al. (2002) examined the care of 112,900 fee-for-service Medicare
beneficiaries admitted with an acute myocardial infarction from February 1994 through
July 1995 to determine the relationship between managed care market share and the use
of recommended therapies for those beneficiaries with acute myocardial infarction. Their
results showed that patients with traditional fee-for-service care, living in areas with high
managed care market share, were more likely to be treated with beta-blockers and
aspirin, which commonly considered as appropriate treatment, than those who were
residing in areas with low managed care market share. Meanwhile, Meara et al. (2004)
studied how managed care market share affects the proportion of fee-for-service
Medicare beneficiaries admitted for acute myocardial infarction (AMI), using a sample of
206,450 Medicare beneficiaries included in the Cooperative Cardiovascular Project (CCP).
They used logistic regression to examine the association between managed care market
share and the use of angiography and concluded that an increased market share of
managed care at the county level is negatively related to the use of coronary angiography
in AMI patients enrolled in traditional Medicare plans.
Dowd et al. (2011) used sample selection methods that correct for observed
covariates and found that HMO enrollees have lower mortality than beneficiaries in
traditional fee-for-service Medicare. By studying the use of services and quality of care for
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beneficiaries in 2009, Afendulis, Chernew and Kessler (2013) also found that the
expansion of MA plans can reduce beneficiaries’ rates of hospitalization and mortality. In
another paper, Baicker, Chernew and Robbins (2013) used changes of the MA payment
policy to isolate exogenous increase in MA enrollment and trace out the effects of greater
managed care penetration on hospital utilization and spending, and they found that great
managed care penetration is not associated with fewer hospitalizations, but is associated
with lower costs and shorter stays per hospitalization.
Meanwhile, Keating et al. (2005) studied a sample population diagnosed with
breast or colorectal cancer during 1993-1999, using fixed effects regression analysis to
evaluate whether county-level increases in the market share of managed care over time
are related to the quality of cancer care, as measured by several quality indicators. They
concluded that an increase in the market share of managed care has limited or no effect
on the quality of care received by patients in the fee-for-service sector.
3.3 Research Gaps and Contributions
Despite the fact that great attentions have been paid by more and more
economists in this area, the existing literature on managed care suffers from several
limitations. First, due to data availability, most of the previous literature relied on data
before MMA 2003. Payment methods have changed significantly since MMA, however, so
results from the outdated data may no longer be referential. Conclusions based on this
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limited data may lead to inaccurate or incorrect recommendations to current Medicare
policies.
Second, most studies included only information about HMOs. Even though HMOs
take the largest share (65%) of Medicare enrollees, regression results from HMO
penetration may not be generalizable to all managed care (Mukamel et al., 2001). As
mentioned earlier, the number of Medicare Advantage enrollees in both local and
regional PPOs has grown rapidly in recent years. Because different plan types within
managed care organizations have different arrangements with physicians and hospitals,
leading to different incentives and responses, the result may be different outputs for
managed care enrollees and traditional fee-for-service enrollees.
Third, most previous research has been unable to address the adverse selection
problem that arises because the health of persons who choose an HMO may differ
systematically from those who do not choose an HMO. Some economists have
demonstrated that persons who have formed strong relationship with their physicians,
usually less healthy enrollees who need to visit physicians frequently, are less likely to join
a managed care plan in which they might not be able to keep their current physician
(Hellinger 1998). If healthier individuals systematically enroll in Medicare HMO plans, the
quality of health care for those remaining in the fee-for-service sector, which is usually
measured by patient readmission, in-hospital mortality, post-30-day hospital mortality,
and hospital-acquired infections, will be lower in counties with high HMO penetration,
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even though there is no spillover effect by managed care penetration. Thus, if selection
bias is not controlled for, the spillover effect is likely to be underestimated. Evidence from
early studies indicated that favorable selection persisted through the late 1980s and early
1990. Riley, et al. used 1994 data from MCBS, and found that HMO respondents were less
likely to report fair or poor health after controlling for demographics. Cao and McGuire
(2003) found two different effects between FFS plans and MA plans: a positive related
spillover effect and negative related selection effect. They used Medicare data for 1996
to estimate the correlation between the HMO market share and the average FFS costs for
different health care services, finding that when the HMO market penetration rate is
below 15%, the selection effect dominates the spillover effect. The spillover effect starts
to dominate the selection effect as the HMO share increases to above 18%.
Other recent studies found that there might not be a selection issue when a
proper methodological approach is used. Mello et al. (2003) used 1992–1996 data from
MCBS and found no significant association between favorable HMO selection and HMO
market penetration. Chernew et al. (2008) also used data from MCBS, and found no
systematic evidence of selection effects after estimating models with the largest set of
health status controls. Without a consistent conclusion regarding adverse selection,
assuming that there is no adverse selection might lead to biased estimators and incorrect
conclusions.
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Forth, unobserved heterogeneity may also bias the estimation. There may be
unobserved, time-varying county level characteristics that are correlated with both
managed care penetration and quality of FFS, such as consolidation in the provider
market or changes in employer demand (Chernew et al 2008). To correct for this potential
bias, an instrumental variables (IV) approach is usually applied. Some authors use countylevel payment rates from CMS to HMOs as instruments to identify the effect of countylevel Medicare penetration (Town and Liu 2003; Gowrisankaran and Town 2006; Chernew
et al. 2008; Nicholas 2009). Since large employers are more likely than small employers to
offer their employees a choice of insurance plans, including the choice to enroll in
managed care plans, some authors prefer to use a cut-off for firms of 100 or more
employees per capita in the HAS as the instrument variable (Bokhari, 2009), or the
average number of employees per firm in the corresponding MSA (Mas and Seinfeld,
2008; Baker and Brown, 1997).
This paper contributes to the literature on the spillover effect of managed care
penetration in four main ways. First, it examines more recent data than prior studies. This
study updates the literature on spillover effect through 2009, whereas most previous
studies only looked at the 1990s. Second, by using the MCBS data, it can calculate 30-day
readmission rates as the quality measure, which is the same indicator used by CMS to
compare the quality of hospitals and determine the payment. Third, the analysis of
market penetration is conducted at the county level and focused only on counties located
in metro areas, which is a better estimate of the market than using the MSA level or
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including all counties. Fourth, the data contain information on area characteristics and
economic characteristics, such as unemployment rate, which allows careful control of
market structure and economic fluctuation.
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CHAPTER 4: ECONOMETRIC MODEL
This section develops an econometric model to find the connection between the
quality of traditional Medicare and the penetration of Medicare advantage plans.
4.1 Basic Model
The basic model is designed to find the spillover effect of MA expansion on the
quality of care patients received under traditional Medicare at the county level.
Specifically, the model measures the hospitalization of beneficiary i in hospital k located
in county j, as a function of MA penetration in county j, the health and demographic
characteristics of beneficiary i, hospital k’s characteristics, county j’s characteristics and
year fixed-effects. The equation looks like:
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 𝛼1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛼2 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡 𝛼3 + 𝐻𝑘𝑡 𝛼4 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝛼5 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡

(1)

where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the dependent variable to measure the hospital quality, and in this study it
is a binary variable with value 1 if the beneficiary i had a hospital readmission in hospital k
in county j in year t, and 0 is there is no readmission; 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 is the MA
penetration rate in county j in year t, which equals the number of enrollees over the
number of Medicare eligible; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of individual characteristics (including age,
race and risk, etc.); 𝑍𝑗𝑡 is a vector of area time varying characteristics (including measures
of area-level population demographics and economic conditions, like median household
income, unemployment rate, mortality rate, etc.); 𝐻𝑘𝑡 is a vector of hospital
characteristics (including hospital ownership, teaching status, hospital size, etc.); 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is
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a vector to control year effects (my research will cover the period of 2006-2009). My
analytic sample is restricted to all MCBS respondents at age 65 and older with traditional
Medicare (both Part A and Part B) for the entire year or enrolled in traditional Medicare
until death in that year.
This regression model requires careful analysis since the disturbance term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 in
Equation (1) is likely correlated with penetration of county-level Medicare Advantage
plans, which will cause the problem of endogeneity. This endogeneity issue was pointed
out and tested by health economists in the penetration study of Medicare Advantage
plans. There may exist other variables that could be related to both the quality of hospital
care and the penetration rates of MA plans, such as the market power and quality of each
hospital. It is possible that Medicare Advantage plans tend to enter counties with higher
traditional fee-for-service spending because of a higher Medicare payment rate. (As
mentioned earlier, the calculation of the MA payment is positively related to traditional
FFS spending in recent years.) Counties with higher traditional fee-for-service spending
are also more likely to own more advanced medical equipment, hire more experienced
physicians, and provide higher quality health care. In this case, the estimation of 𝛼1 is
expected to be biased upwards. If the true value of 𝛼1 is negative, the estimation of the
marginal effect will be biased toward zero.
This potential bias can be corrected by using the instrumental variables (IV)
approach. In a linear model, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator method is the
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most popular and widely used approach to solve the problem brought by endogenous
explanatory variables. In the 2SLS method, the endogenous variables are first regressed
on all the exogenous variables including the instruments, and then the predicted value of
the endogenous variable is used in place of its actual value in a regression. Since in my
model, quality is measured by a binary variable, 2SLS could not be used to estimate the
model. In this nonlinear regression model, two estimation methods have been widely
used to address endogeneity: two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS), and two-stage
residual inclusion (2SRI). (In the following sub-section, the two methods are explained in
detail.) Terza et al. (2008) examined the two estimation methods, and concluded that
2SPS is generally an inconsistent procedure, while 2SRI produces consistent estimates of
the structural equation parameters. Thus 2SRI will be used in this study to solve the
problem of endogeneity.
4.2 Econometric Method
To estimate the spillover effect, I will construct a Probit model with a set of
instrumental variables. I deﬁne 𝑦𝑖 as an observed binary variable: the outcome to be
explained. Let 𝑥𝑖 be a vector of observed regressors, and β a corresponding coeﬃcient
vector, with e an unobserved error. The Probit model can be written as
𝑦𝑖 ∗ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖 𝛽 + 𝑒𝑖

𝑦𝑖 = 1[𝑦𝑖 ∗ > 0],

(2)

where I use the notation 1[.] as the indicator function to define a binary outcome. If some
of the explaining variables are endogenous, 𝑋𝑖 could be divided into 𝑋𝑖𝑒 , which is a 1 × 𝑁1
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vectors of endogenous variables and are possibly correlated with 𝑒𝑖 , and 𝑋𝑖𝑜 , which is a
1 × 𝑁2 vectors of exogenous variables. Then I can rewrite the model as
𝑦𝑖 = 1[𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑒 𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖𝑜 𝛽𝑜 + 𝑒𝑖 > 0]

(3)

𝑋𝑖𝑒 = 𝑍𝑖 𝜋1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑜 𝜋2 + 𝜎𝜀 𝜀𝑖

(4)

𝑒𝑖
1
(𝜀 ) | 𝑍𝑖 ~𝑁 [0, (
𝜌
𝑖

(5)

𝜌
) ]
1

where 𝑍𝑖 is is a 1 × 𝐾 vectors of instrumental variables. The instrumental variables must
satisfy the following three conditions: (1) they cannot be correlated with the error term 𝜀𝑖
in Equation 4; (2) they must be partially and sufficiently strongly correlated with 𝑋𝑖𝑒 after
controlling for all of the other independent variables; and (3) they can neither have a
direct inﬂuence on 𝑦𝑖 nor be correlated with the error term 𝑒𝑖 in Equation 3. Further, the
Probit model assumes that 𝑒𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖 have a joint standard normal distribution. If 𝜌 ≠ 0,
𝑒𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖 are correlated, which can prove that X 𝑒 is endogenous or misspecified, and it is
correlated with 𝑒𝑖 . In that case, the instrumental variables approach is recommended to
run the regression model and get the unbiased estimated parameters. This relationship
will be used later to test the endogeneity assumption.
There are two ways the model can be estimated to solve the endogeneity problem.
One method is called two-stage predictor substation (2SPS), the other is called two-stage
residual inclusion (2SRI). Estimation by 2SPS is a straightforward extension of the popular
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linear two-stage least squares (2SLS) to nonlinear models from the simple linear model. In
the first-stage, obtain consistent estimators of the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑒 by estimating Equation 4 as
̂𝑖𝑒 = 𝑍𝑖 𝜋
𝑋
̂1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑜 𝜋
̂2

(6)

̂𝑖𝑒 in Equation 6, in the second-stage, β = [𝛽𝑒 𝛽𝑜 ] can be estimated
After getting 𝑋
̂𝑖𝑒 into Equation 3 using nonlinear least squares
in Equation 7 by substituting 𝑋𝑖𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑋
methods.
̂𝑖𝑒 𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖𝑜 𝛽𝑜 + 𝑒𝑖 > 0]
𝑦𝑖 = 1[𝛼 + 𝑋

(7)

With 2SRI methods, the first-stage of 2SRI estimator is identical to that of 2SPS,
which is to estimate Equation 6, but the residuals need to be calculated and saved for use
in the second stage. The residual is calculated as
̂ 𝑖=𝑋
̂𝑖𝑒 − (𝑍𝑖 𝜋
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
̂1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑜 𝜋
̂2 )

(8)

In the second-stage of 2SRI the set of variables 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 are added to Equation
3 as additional regressors, i.e., using nonlinear least squares method to estimate β =
[𝛽𝑒 𝛽𝑜 ]
̂ 𝑖 𝛽𝑟 + 𝑣𝑖 > 0]
𝑦𝑖 = 1[𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑒 𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖𝑜 𝛽𝑜 + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠

(9)

where 𝑣𝑖 is the regression error term. The reason estimation bias can be removed with
the 2SRI method is because by adding the residual terms into Equation 9, those omitted
variables that are both correlated with 𝑦𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝑖𝑒 are controlled in the regression model
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by adding the set of variables 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠. Thus, the endogeneity issue of 𝑋𝑖𝑒 would cease
to exist, and unbiased estimators can be concluded.
Since the relationship between the quality of beneficiaries under traditional
Medicare and penetration of Medicare Advantage plans is the primary focus of this
research, it is important to determine how much the penetration of MA plans could affect
care quality. However, the values of β = [𝛽𝑒 𝛽𝑜 ] calculated from 2SPS and 2SRI don’t
imply much beyond the signs of the estimators. Instead, the estimated marginal effects
can be a better determinant of the spillover effects.
Under the Probit model specification, the joint normality of 𝑒𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖 implies that
the conditional distribution of 𝑒𝑖 given 𝜀𝑖 is also normal as follows
𝑒𝑖 | 𝜀𝑖 ~ 𝑁(𝜌𝜀𝑖 , 1 − 𝜌2 )

(10)

Therefore, the response probability for 𝑦𝑖 can be derived as:
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖 ) = 𝑃(𝑦𝑖 ∗ > 0|𝑋𝑖 ) = 𝑃(𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑒 𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖𝑜 𝛽𝑜 + 𝑒𝑖 > 0|𝑋𝑖 )
= P[𝑒𝑖 > −(𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑒 𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖𝑜 𝛽𝑜 )|𝑋𝑖 ]

= Φ(

𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑒 𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖𝑜 𝛽𝑜 + 𝜌𝜀𝑖
).
1 − 𝜌2

(11)

If 𝑥𝑖𝑒 is a continuous variable, its partial effect is obtained from the partial
derivative:
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𝛽𝑒𝑗
𝜕𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝑒 )
𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑒 𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖𝑜 𝛽𝑜 + 𝜌𝜀𝑖
=
φ
(
)∗
𝑒
2
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑗
1−𝜌
1 − 𝜌2

(12)

Because Φ(∙) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of continuous random
variables, φ(∙) is a probability density function. In the Probit model, φ(∙) > 0. Thus, the
partial effect always has the same sign as 𝛽𝑒𝑗 (Wooldridge, 2010).
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CHAPTER 5: DATA SOURCE AND DESCRIPTION
The main data source in this study is the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey
(MCBS) for the years 2006 to 2009, a period concurrent with the introduction of Part D
and regional PPOs, and before the implementation of the ACA. This was a period of fast
growth in MA plans enrollment, and changes in many features of managed care. The
MCBS is a continuous, multipurpose survey of a nationally representative sample of aged
and disabled Medicare beneficiaries sponsored by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS). The MCBS uses a rotating panel design. There are four panels active at
any given time and each panel has approximately 4,000 sample participants. New panels
are introduced each year in the fall round and replace the oldest panel. A key feature of
the survey is its longitudinal design. Currently, each sample person is interviewed three
times a year over four years. Two data files from the MCBS are released in the annual
Access to Care and Cost and Use files. Additional information on the MCBS can be found
at the CMS website (www.cms.gov).
Another important data source is CMS research data bank, including county-level
payment and enrollment for each plan for 2006-2009. Monthly enrollment data comes
from the Monthly MA Enrollment by State/County/Contract data file, which provides the
stated information for all organization types except Prescription Drug Plans (PDP) and
employer-direct PDP organizations. County-level eligible Medicare beneficiary data is
drawn from the MA State/County Penetration data file. County-level payment rates come
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from the Medicare Advantage Ratebook data file. These data were obtained from the
CMS website (www.cms.gov) under the Research, Statistics, Data & Systems section.
The third data source is the AHA (American Hospital Association) Hospital
Database, compiled from the AHA Annual Survey of hospitals. It includes each hospital’s
information in four aspects: organizational structure, facilities and services, total
utilization and staffing, and supplemental information. In this study, hospital level
information is used from 2006 to 2009, including the locations of hospitals, facilities and
services, beds, utilization, and staffing. Further information about the AHA annual survey
is available at the AHA website (www.aha.org) and all data is purchased from AHA.
The last data source is the 2012-2013 Area Health Resources Files (AHRF). The
AHRF is a family of health data resource products, collected from more than 50 sources,
and provides county-level economic and demographic information by year (such as
unemployment rate, population density, and median household income), as well as
county-level health statistic information (such as the number of specialists, mortality rate
and total hospital beds). Further information is available at the Health Resources and
Services Administration website (www.ahrf.hrsa.gov).
In this study, all penetration rates, MA payment, and area characteristics variables
are measured at the county level, but includes only counties located in metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs). The reasons why I exclude rural counties are because first, many
rural counties offer only a limited number of managed care plans or even no MA plans,
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which can cause results that use all county level measurement to be susceptible and
biased; second, most rural counties have small numbers of residents, which leads to a
smaller amount of enrollment in MA plans, and insufficient sample size in small counties
may lead to inaccurate regression; and third hospital behavior in small counties may
differ from hospital behavior in large urban areas, specifically, hospital markets located in
counties in metro areas are more likely to be characterized as monopolistically
competitive markets, whiles hospital markets in rural counties may resemble oligopoly or
monopoly markets.
There are 1101 counties located in metro areas out of a total 3250 counties. As
Table 1 shows, more than 90% of all HMO enrollees live in metropolitan areas; about 84%
of local PPO enrollees and 76% of regional PPO enrollees come from MSA areas. Thus, the
sample of urban counties can represent all counties very well and it is logical to focus this
study sample on counties located in urban areas.
Other studies have been based on the MSA level instead of county level, because
the MSA level measures a larger and more reasonable market since patients may choose
hospitals within the metro area instead of the county either for convenience or quality.
However, there are at least two limitations to choosing MSA as the measurement
unit in this research. First, this study will use payments to Medicare Advantage plans from
CMS as the instrument variables, but the payments are calculated at county level by CMS.
Any method to aggregate the payment to the MSA level may lead to bias. Second, Meara
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et al. (2004) claimed that there exists considerable heterogeneity in the level of market
share of managed care within MSAs, and this may be related to the smaller number of
MSAs and the relatively less variation among MSAs (Jiang et al, 2013). Thus, using a
county-level measure of market share allows the capture of this variation in the analyses.
The unit of observation is the Medicare beneficiary individual level, and the
analytic sample is restricted to MCBS respondents age 65 or older enrolled in traditional
Medicare (both Part A and Part B) for the entire year. Individual characteristic and MA
market fixed-effects are included to remove bias that might result from time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity across hospitals and counties.
5.1 Dependent Variable
The purpose of this research is to measure how the quality of hospital care
received by patients under traditional Medicare plans is affected by the penetration of
Medicare Advantage plans. Quality of health care always plays an extremely important
role in monitoring health systems and is a critical factor in evaluating and comparing
hospitals. This study uses available data to focus on readmissions within 30 days of
discharge as an indicator of health care quality. The dependent variable is a binary
variable, which equals to 1 if the patient gets readmitted within 30 days after discharge
from a hospital. This indicator is particularly related to hospital quality to those of 65
years of age and older. The quality indicator is constructed by using the annual Cost and
Use file of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) for elderly respondents
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excluding patients under age 65 years (i.e., those entitled to Medicare because of
disability).
The 30-day readmission measures are estimates of unplanned readmission for any
cause to any acute care hospital within 30 days of discharge. It is often used to evaluate
overall hospital performance since readmission may be caused by errors in hospital or
premature discharge prompted by pressure to vacate hospital beds. Both causes can lead
to readmission and could be avoided. Patients may be readmitted to the same hospital or
to a different hospital for the same condition or for a different reason. Even though
readmission for the same condition is a better measurement of the previous hospital care,
it can be difficult to restrict the readmissions to the same condition since the new
condition may be caused by improper treatment of original condition. This study will thus
use same and different condition readmission rates.
Readmission within 30 days was measured, rather than a longer or shorter period,
because readmissions over longer periods may be influenced by factors outside hospitals’
control, such as other complicating illnesses, patients’ own behavior, or care provided to
patients after discharge. Readmissions over shorter periods are more likely to be affected
by patients’ own disease or physicians’ advice. To conduct a robust test, this study will
also measure 60-day and 90-day readmission rates to test whether the spillover effect is
sensitive to the number of days.
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Table 2 shows the average 30-day readmission rate is about 22% in this study
sample, while the 60-day readmission rate is 29% and the 90-day readmission rate is
about 31.8%. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 required CMS to
establish a Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program in Medicare FFS to reduce Inpatient
Prospective Payment System (IPPS) payments to hospitals that have excess readmissions.
CMS also sponsored the Partnership for Patients in 2011 to reduce readmission rates of
traditional FFS Medicare patients by 20% between 2010 and the end of 2013.
5.2 Explanatory Variables
The dependent variables fall into four groups: MA penetration, county
characteristics,

patient

characteristics

(including

risk

adjusters),

and

hospital

characteristics.

5.2.1 Market Penetration of Plans
The first and most interesting group includes the penetration rates of MA plans. In
this study, managed care penetration at the county level is the share of the Medicare
eligible population in the county enrolled in managed care in a given year. For example,
the HMO penetration rate in Wayne County in 2006 is calculated as the number of
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs in 2006 divided by the Medicare eligible
population

in

Wayne

County.

CMS

has

monthly

MA

enrollment

data

by

state/county/contract from October 2006 available online. Because this research period is
from 2006 to 2009, October data is used to represent 2006, and June is used for the
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remaining years. CMS, however, has the monthly data of eligible beneficiaries only from
June 2008 to June 2013, which makes it impossible to calculate the enrollment rates for
2006 and 2007. Fortunately, the growth rate of Medicare eligible enrollees is pretty stable
in the last five years. So the average growth rate is used here to calculate backward the
Medicare eligible enrollees for the years 2006 and 2007. All data in this group comes from
the CMS Medicare Advantage enrollment data.
Table 3 provides summary data regarding the penetration rates of MA plans and
the number of counties in the sample that offer at least one MA contract out of 1101
MSA counties. It shows the penetration rate of HMO plans was about 12%, the
penetration rate of PFFS was about 6%, and the enrollment rates of Local PPO and
regional PPO were relatively small but increased significantly during the four years. The
penetration rate of Coordinated Care Plans accounted for about 14%.

5.2.2 County Characteristics
The second group of explanatory variables is county characteristics, including
median household income, population density, percent of eligible Medicaid enrollees
over 65, three-year mortality rate for people over 65, hospital beds per 1,000 people,
poverty rate, percentage of males, and so on. For the data on population density and
median household income, this study puts the nature logarithms in as independent
variables. All the county characteristic data are from Area Resource File (ARF, 2012-2013
release). During this period, America went through an economic boom brought by
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housing market, and the Great Recession due to the burst of housing bubble. So the
county-level unemployment rate is also included to control for the potential influence of
macroeconomic fluctuation.

Table 4 reports summary statistics for all county-level

variables used in the Probit model to control for the county fixed effect.

5.2.3 Patient Characteristics
The third group of variables is patient characteristics, including race, age, and risk,
where all the data also comes from MCBS. Because different patients have different
admission conditions, we need to control for different diagnoses in order to use
readmission to measure the quality of inpatient care. The claim files list each patient’s
first three ICD-9 diagnosis codes. I use the Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) Model
to map each ICD-9 code to 1 of 70 HCCs. HCC coding is a payment model mandated in
1997 by CMS and implemented in 2003 to identify individuals with serious or chronic
illness. It assigns a value to each HCC to measure the risk.
For example, for ICD-9 code 174.9 malignant neoplasm of breast (female), the
corresponding HCC is 10 with an HCC weight of 0.187. The HCC weight could be used as
an accurate value to control for each patient’s risk upon admission. So the average value
of three recorded ICD-9 diagnosis HCC risk weights can be calculated for each patient.
Table 5 gives the patient characteristic summary that lists all the variables used to control
patient-level fixed effect. It shows the risk index ranges from 0 to 6.5, with an average of
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0.7. The case mix index is also included, which is a relative value assigned to a diagnosis
related group (DRG) of patients in a Medicare care environment.

5.2.4 Hospital Characteristics
Hospital characteristics include several variables to control hospital ownership,
quality and size of each hospital, in the model. Hospitals are usually categorized as notfor-profit (NFP), for-profit (FP), or government institutions. Type of ownership plays an
important role in determining the quality of hospital care. Shen (2002) examined the
effect of ownership choice on patient outcomes after the treatment for acute myocardial
infarction (AMI), using the data from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey
and the Medicare hospital cost reports from 1985 to 1994. She concluded that for-proﬁt
and government hospitals have a three to four percent higher incidence of adverse
outcomes than not-for-proﬁt hospitals. Table 6 summarizes the hospital information,
showing that not-for-profit, private hospitals take the highest percentage at 73 percent

5.2.5 Instrument with Payment Rates
Recent studies point out that managed care penetration in a market is subject to
endogeneity concerns, because missing variables may exist that are related to managed
care penetration. To address this concern, this study uses data on payment from CMS to
each MA plan in each county from 2006 to 2009. Beginning in 2006, the average monthly
payment rate per county was used as the benchmark for plan bids. Table 7 shows the
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variation in MA payment between the four types of plans over the four years. Payment
rates for all four plan types increased.
To prepare the entire data for regression, the data had to be merged. All the data
from CMS and ARF comes with Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and SSA
county codes, so the penetration and competition data with area characteristics data can
be merged using either FIPS or SSA. For Medicare quality and patient characteristics from
MCBS data bank, the Medicare claim files for MCBS include inpatients’ hospital
information, and CMS has a general hospital information file with each hospital’s location
and hospital owner. The MCBS data with CMS data can thus be merged using the county
name. All data merging work is accomplished by using SAS 9.3.
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CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RELATED ISSUES
In this section, the empirical models will be estimated using two different
methods: 1) the simple Probit model without instrumental variables; 2) the Probit model
with instruments using the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method. The rationale for
including the simple Probit model is to provide a basis for evaluating the extent to which
the results are sensitive to the assumption that the penetration of Medicare Advantage
plans are exogenous independent variables.
6.1 Endogeneity Tests
Recent research found that the penetration of county-level Medicare Advantage
plans are endogenous, because there may exist unobserved time-varying county-level
variables that are correlated with both the penetration of MA plans and the quality of
traditional Medicare (Chernew et. al, 2008; Baicker et. al, 2013). Thus, it is necessary to
test the endogeneity assumption before running the model, in order to get unbiased and
efficient estimators.
The exogeneity test in the 2SRI model arises from the second stage equation. In
the second stage, the residuals from the auxiliary regressions are included as substituted
for the unobserved variables. The most straightforward method to test exogeneity of the
penetration rate can be constructed from the following null and alternative hypotheses:
𝐻0 : 𝛽𝑟 = 0 and 𝐻1 : 𝛽𝑟 ≠ 0 where 𝛽𝑟 is the parameter estimate on 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 from
Equation 9. If the test statistic (in this case, the F test) is significantly different from zero,
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then we can reject 𝐻0 and the assumption of exogeneity of the penetration rate of the
four MA plans included in my model.
Table 8 shows the results of endogeneity tests. 𝛽𝑟1 is the coefficient of residual for
running the first stage regression of CCPs penetration rate, and 𝛽𝑟2 is the coefficient of
residual for running the first stage regression of PFFS penetration rate. The regression
result rejects the hypothesis that the penetration rates of either CCPs are exogenous at
the 1% level. Thus, I assert that the exogeneity test results indicate that the penetration
rate of the MA plans appear to be endogenous in the regression model. Then the new
challenge in accounting for this endogeneity is to find a set of good instrumental variables
for the Probit model.
To correct the potential bias coming from endogeneity, instrumental variables (IV)
are used to substitute the penetration of the Medicare Advantage plans. Chernew et al.
(2008) used county-level payment rate from CMS to Medicare Advantage plans to identify
the effect of the penetration of county-level Medicare Advantage plans. In order to satisfy
the three conditions of good instrumental variables listed earlier, these payment rates
should be correlated with county-level penetration, but not correlated with the quality of
traditional Medicare.
The assumption of the correlations between county-level penetration rates of MA
plans and payment rates is reasonable. As Chernew et al. (2008) mentioned, increasing
the payments will increase the profitability of the marginal enrollee, which will increase
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profit incentives for more insurance companies to enter the MA market and offer more
generous plans to increase enrollment.
Next the county-level payment rates are tested to insure they are not related to
the quality of traditional Medicare. As reviewed in Chapter 2, since 2003, Medicare has
paid the highest of (1) an urban or rural floor payment; (2) 100 percent of risk-adjusted
traditional Medicare FFS spending in the county (calculated using a five-year moving
average lagged three years); (3) a minimum update over the prior year rate of 2 percent
or traditional Medicare’s national expenditure growth rate, whichever was greater; or (4)
a blended payment rate update. Beginning in 2006, Medicare started a bidding process
for plan payments. The bids are compared to benchmark amounts set by the highest
payment to the previous four choices. If a plan’s bid is higher than the benchmark, the
payment equals the benchmark. If the bid is lower than the benchmark, the plan and
Medicare split the difference between the bid and the benchmark. Thus, it is reasonable
to assume that county-level payment rates are not correlated with quality indicators used
in this research.
While the assumption that county-level payment rates are good instrumental
variables, the following conditions still need to be tested: 1) the instrumental variables
are not significantly related with the explained variables; 2) the payment rates are not
“weak” instruments. Empirically, the first condition can be test by adding the vector of
payments in to Equation 1, as to the Equation (13). Then the coefficient vector 𝜃 is tested.
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The regression result shows that the null hypothesis of 0 at the 5% level cannot be
rejected. Then the first condition is test: the instrumental variables are not significantly
related to the explained variables
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 𝛼1 + 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 𝜃 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛼2 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡 𝛼3 + 𝐻𝑘𝑡 𝛼4 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝛼5
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡

(13)

The strength of the instrumental set, as listed in the second condition, is tested by
a standard F-test. All of three F-statistics (penetration rates of HMO, CCP and PFFS) are
greater than 66, and a standard rule-of-thumb is that this F-statistic be greater than 10.
Thus, the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are unrelated to county-level
Medicare Advantage plans can be strongly rejected. Then the second condition is tested:
the payment rates are not weak instruments. Thus the instruments used in this paper
satisfy the two conditions.
6.2 First Stage Results
Table 9 shows the results of the first stage estimation where observations are
constructed at the county level, instead of individual patient level as used in the second
stage regression. Instrumental variables must be tested in the county level, because there
is a significant variation in MA enrollment by state and county, ranging from 49 percent in
Minnesota to less than 1 percent in Alaska. Thus, different counties will have different
numbers of patients, and a model conducted at the individual level will lead to oversampling for counties with more Medicare beneficiaries and under-sampling for counties
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with fewer Medicare beneficiaries. The penetration rates of HMO, PFFS and CCP are
tested, because HMO and CCP are used in the second stage to measure the penetration
of Medicare Advantage plans, and PFFS is used as a comparison group. All the equations
include the county and year fixed effect (as seen in Equation 14).
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑡 𝛼1 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡 𝛼4 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝛼6 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(14)

The results suggest that an increase in payment to HMOs by $100 will increase the
penetration rate of HMO by 13.8 percent. All the R2 value shows that the instruments are
not weak.
6.3 Parameter Estimates
Table 10 presents the main results of the paper. Here, 30-day readmission is used
as the quality indicator. Model one and Model two use standard Probit models without
instruments, and Model three and Model four use Probit models with payment rates as
the instrumental variables. To make the coefficients more meaningful, all coefficients are
presented by explaining and measuring the marginal effect of each variable.
In the Probit models, as presented in the first two columns, the estimated
coefficients on either Medicare HMO or CCPs are larger (but smaller in absolute value)
than the IV estimates in the last two columns. This result supports the endogeneity
assumption that Medicare Advantage plan might enter into markets with relatively high
cost growth in expenditures.
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The first and the most important part of the results in Table 10 show that the
expansion of MA plans (either HMO plans or CCP plans) has a significant negative effect
on the probability of readmission. Specifically, the result in Model three shows that a 1
percent higher HMO penetration rate will lead to 1.5 percent lower readmission rate.
Results in Model four show that a 1% increase in CCP is related to a 1.265 percent lower
readmission rate. The market share of PFFS has a negative but not significant effect on
the probability of readmission.
The second part of the regression table presents the results of patient
characteristics. For the age of patient variable, the controlling group is ages higher than
84. It shows that the younger group has a lower, but not significant, probability of
readmission. Another interesting variable is self-assessment of health condition. The
control group is in bad health. It shows that the better health condition group has a lower
rate of readmission, and the results are significant. Compared to patients in bad health,
patients reporting excellent health have 8.75 percent lower 30-day readmission rate. The
last important and strongly significant variables are risk index and DRG weight. The risk is
calculated from the diagnosis code for each patient. Higher risk is related with higher
probability of readmission; if the patient’s risk increases by 1 percent, the probability of
readmission will increase by 3 percent.
The third part of the result shows the year fixed effect. Compared to 2006, the
three following years have higher readmission rates, and the years of 2008 and 2009 are
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significantly higher than 2006. In other words, hospital care quality had been getting
worse over this four-year period.
The next section describes how county characteristics affect hospital quality.
Counties with low population density and high household income tend to have higher
hospital care quality. In addition, compared to counties in the Eastern U.S., counties
located in the West have lower hospital care quality.
Last but not least is the influence of hospital characteristics. As mentioned before,
the type of hospital ownership plays an important role in determining the quality of
hospital care. As shown in table 10, compared with non-profit, private hospitals, patients
discharged from government-owned hospitals have 2.69 perecent lower probability of
readmission.
6.4 Alternative Indicators of Quality Measurement
In this section, alternative dependent variables are used to measure the quality,
such as the 60-day readmission rate and 90-day readmission rate. The results in table 11
show that a 1 percent higher CCP share can decrease the 60-day readmission rate by 1.08
percent, and can decrease the 90-day readmission rate by 1.16 percent. Thus, the results
are robust and it is safe to conclude that the expansion of MA plans could positively affect
health care quality, using readmission rate as the quality indicator.
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6.5 Chronic Conditions
Most previous research measures quality by considering one specific disease to
control for the complexity of assessing a variety of different diseases. In this section, the
sample is restricted to patients who report having one of four chronic conditions,
including hypertension, cancer, stroke and diabetes. The regression results in table 12
show that a 1 percent increase in CCP plan penetration rate can reduce the 30-day
readmission rate by 0.99 percent for patients with hypertension; by 3.11 percent for
patients with cancer; and by 1.38 percent for patients with stroke. However, for patients
with diabetes, even though the quality is negatively related to the expansion rate, the
relationship is not significant 10 percent.
6.6 Selection Effect Test
The measurement of spillover effects may be affected by selection bias, meaning
the choice between traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage plans is not random. A
common concern is whether relatively healthier beneficiaries are more likely to choose
fee-for-service Medicare. If so, the quality for those remaining in the fee-for-service will
decrease, since healthier enrollees who were previously enrolled in fee-for-service plans
may switch to MA plans and enrollees under worse health condition who were previously
enrolled in MA plans may switch to fee-for-service plans. The existence of possible
selection bias could definitely affect the spillover effect measured in this paper.
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Fortunately, since patient characteristic information is available in the MCBS data,
patient characteristics variables are included in my model to control patient’s fixed effect.
Thus, there is no selection bias concern in this research. Out of interest, though, I tested
the compositional change by regressing the Medicare Advantage plans penetration and
various demographic and health-related variables in this section. As Chernew, et. al.,
(2008) did, I replacedthe dependent variable with age and health-rated measures to see
whether the penetration rates are related to patient characteristics (see Equation 15). In
my main model, I have dozens of variables about patient characteristics. To simplify the
analysis, focused on cancer, risk, DRG weight, stroke and diabetes as the dependent
variables.
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 𝛼1 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡 𝛼2 + 𝐻𝑘𝑡 𝛼3 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝛼3 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(15)

The results in table 13 show that none of the coefficients of either CCP share or
PFFS share are significant. Thus, there exists no systematic evidence of selection bias in
the model, which is the same conclusion as Chernew et. al., (2008).
6.7 Explanation of the Findings
The major purpose of this empirical study is to better understand how the
penetration rates of Medicare Advantage plans will spill over into the traditional
Medicare sector, considering the rapid growth of MA plans in recent years. Specifically, it
investigates whether the expansion of MA plans will affect the quality of health care for
patients remaining in the traditional Medicare sector. To answer the question whether
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government should continue to support the development of MA plans, a Probit model
with instrumental variable method is applied to run the regression, and patient
characteristics are well controlled to avoid selection bias.
The regression results suggest that the increasing Medicare Advantage
penetration can reduce the hospital readmission rate. Using payment rates from CMS to
MA plans as instrumental variables, I find that a 1 percent increase in CCP penetration
rate will lead to a 1.13 percent reduction of 30-day readmission in the traditional
Medicare sector. Because lower readmission is always favored by patients and considered
a sign of higher quality care, the expansion of MA plans has a strong and significant
positive spillover effect on the quality of hospital care in the traditional Medicare sector.
The same conclusions can be reached if considering the expansion of HMO plans, which a
1 percent increase in HMO penetration will lead to a 1.52 percent reduction of 30-day
readmission rate for patients with traditional Medicare plan.
Several alternative models are built to test the robustness. First, using alternative
indicators of quality (60-day readmission and 90-day readmission), a similar conclusion of
the positive spillover effects is reached. Second, many related studies chose to test the
spillover effect by limiting the sample to patients with specific diseases. To follow their
methods, I conducted a robust test by using four common chronic conditions
(hypertension, cancer, stroke and diabetes), and find that the expansion of MA plans has
a negative effect on the 30-day readmission rate for patients with one of the four chronic

57

conditions, even though the effects are at different scales. Lastly, this research used
MCBS data with detailed patient characteristics to test the selection bias of whether
patients enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans are self-selected. Running patient
characteristics (especially the risk index) with penetration rates controlling county and
hospital fixed effect, resulting in finding that the penetration rate of CCP plans is not
related to patient characteristics, which means there is no selection bias.
Since lower readmission rate is always considered an important indicator of higher
hospital quality, we can assert that the expansion of Medicare Advantage plans can
positively spill over to the traditional Medicare sector. As reviewed in Chapter 3, this
significant positive spillover effect may come from either the physician’s practice patterns,
or through the adoption of shared advanced technology.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
Medicare Advantage plan enrollment has expanded rapidly in recent years, and
this rapid growth has attracted the attention of policymakers and researchers to test the
effectiveness and efficiency of these plans compared to tradition Medicare plans. This
paper is designed to address the question of whether increasing MA plan enrollment is
associated with the quality of hospital care received by fee-for-service Medicare patients,
by constructing the 30-day readmission rate as the quality indicator.
By using the most recent enrollment data and individual MCBS data, this
dissertation has found a statistically significant and beneficial relationship between the
MA penetration in a county and the rate of readmissions to local hospitals. Specifically,
the results show that a 1 percent increase in the Coordinated Care Plan penetration rate
can reduce the 30-day readmission rate by 1.13 percent, reduce 60-day readmission rates
by 1.08 percent, and reduce the 90-day readmission rate by 1.12 percent. Since lower
rates of hospital readmission are widely accepted as an indicator of higher quality, it is
safe to conclude that the expansion of Medicare Advantage plans has had a substantial
beneficial spillover effect on the quality of inpatient care received by beneficiaries under
traditional Medicare. In addition, when the sample is restricted to patients with specific
chronic conditions and 60-day and 90-day readmission rates are used as quality indicators,
a similar conclusion is reached. Thus, the positive spillover effect is robust. Finally, the
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selection bias is tested with the individual data from MCBS, and finds no significant
selection bias, which is consistent with most recent studies.
The findings in this paper are consistent with most recent related research on the
spillover effects of MA penetration. Baicker et al. (2013), for example, found that greater
managed care penetration is associated with lower costs and shorter stays per
hospitalization.
The findings in the research presented here provide strong empirical support for
the continued development of Medicare Advantage plans. The positive spillover effects
from the managed care expansion to improve the quality of fee-for-service beneficiaries
can lead to several important policy implications for the Medicare program. When the
Medicare Advantage plans are evaluated in the future, the policy makers should not only
consider the direct effects on beneficiaries under MA plans, but also the possible spillover
effects. According to the results found here, the government should continue to
encourage enrollment in Medicare Advantage plans by increasing the payment to MA
plans.
There are several limitations in this research. First, as mentioned earlier, quality of
care has numerous dimensions. Using readmission rate as the only quality indicator may
lead to measurement bias. Future research can focus on other types of utilization and
different measures of the quality of care, and test whether the expansion of MA plans will
only spill over to sections of the hospital’s quality measurements or to overall quality.
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Second, the research period for this paper is 2006-2009, which is before the
implementation of the Affordable Care Act of 2010. Future work should also seek to
evaluate the spillover effect of MA after 2010, when the payments to MA plans are totally
different. Finally, future research might investigate whether the expansion of MA plans
will affect competition among hospitals, considering that competitiveness could also have
a spillover effect on the quality of hospital care.
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FIGURE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF MA COUNTY-LEVEL MONTHLY PAYMENT RATES1

Note: the payment rate after 2012 is the average value of the program’s five-star quality
rating. All payment rates are the nominal value, no inflation-adjustment is applied.
SOURCE: CMS, Medicare Advantage (MA) Ratebook files, located online at
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-Plans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Ratebooksand-Supporting-Data.html.

1

The graph is a boxplot to depict the payment rates in all counties through their quartiles.
The green rectangle spans the first quartile to the medium, and the purple rectangle
spans the medium to the third quartile. The lower bound describes the minimum
payment rate, and the upper bound describes the maximum payment rate.
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FIGURE 2 ENROLLMENT (IN MILLIONS) IN MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS, 1985-2003

Note: Data for the number of enrollmees includes local Coordinated Care Plans (riskbased HMOs plus PPOs), Provider Sponsored Organization, private Fee-For-Service (from
2001), regional PPOs (from 2006), and other available MA plans.
SOURCE: CMS, Medicare Advantage Plans Monthly Reports Files and Data, located online
at
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/HealthPlanRepFileData/Monthly.html. All data are from December of the year
indicated, except 2007, which is from November.
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FIGURE 3 ENROLLMENT IN MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS, BY PLAN TYPE, 2006 -2013

Note: “Others” includes cost and demonstration plans.
SOURCE: CMS, Medicare Advantage/Part D Contract and Enrollment Data, Monthly
Contract and Enrollment Summary Report. All data are from June of the year indicated,
except 2006, which is from October, and 2013, which is from May.
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FIGURE 4 MONTHLY CONTRACT SUMMARY REPORT

SOURCE: CMS, Medicare Advantage/Part D Contract and Enrollment Data, Monthly
Contract and Enrollment Summary Report. All data are from July of the year indicated,
except 2008, which is from June, and 2014, which is from February.
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FIGURE 5 AVAILABILITY OF MA PLANS AND PLAN TYPES

SOURCE: CMS, Medicare Advantage/Part D Contract and Enrollment Data, Monthly
Contract and Enrollment Summary Report. All data are from June of the year indicated,
except 2006, which is from October, and 2013, which is from May.
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TABLE 1 ENROLLMENT WITHIN MSA AND ALL COUNTIES LEVEL ACROSS PLAN SUMMARY

HMO

Private
PFFS
Local
PPO
Regional
PPO

MSA
All
Percent
MSA
All
Percent
MSA
All
Percent
MSA
All
Percent

2006
5155605
5668255
90.96%
546444
810277
67.44%
284335
325952
87.23%
73339
87008
84.29%

2007
5283708
5849551
90.33%
1071179
1541356
69.50%
332775
388712
85.61%
120145
148765
80.76%

2008
5733023
6363491
90.09%
1519475
2184014
69.57%
537102
640504
83.86%
207222
274292
75.55%

2009
6171799
6841016
90.22%
1633770
2351523
69.48%
767148
926224
82.83%
304914
415653
73.36%

Total
22344135
24722313

90.38%
4770868
6887170

69.27%
1921360
2281392

84.22%
705620
925718

76.22%

Note: percent equals the ratio of enrollment in MSA over the total enrollment.
SOURCE: CMS, Medicare Advantage/Part D Contract and Enrollment Data, Monthly
Contract and Enrollment Summary Report. All data are from June of the year indicated,
except 2006, which is from October.
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TABLE 2 READMISSION RATE SUMMARY

2006
2007
2008
2009
Average

Mean
N
Mean
N
Mean
N
Mean
N
Mean
N

30-day
Readmission rate
0.2302
1912
0.2252
1999
0.2408
1874
0.2152
1547
0.2284
7332

60-day
Readmission rate
0.2852
1779
0.2955
1859
0.3039
1755
0.2718
1420
0.2900
6813

90-day
Readmission rate
0.3084
1619
0.3267
1715
0.3285
1581
0.3052
1255
0.3180
6170

Note: Column “Mean” measures the readmission rate, Column “N” measures the number
of observations.
Source: MCBS claims data, 2006-2009.
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TABLE 3 MA PENETRATION RATE SUMMARY

HMO share
PFFS share
Local PPO
share
Regional
PPO share

Mean
N
Mean
N
Mean
N
Mean
N

2006
0.1244
648
0.0357
1001
0.0155
477
0.0040
387

2007
0.1148
703
0.0530
1075
0.0176
490
0.0062
550

2008
0.1156
777
0.0698
1086
0.0243
591
0.0094
711

2009
0.1206
806
0.0716
1085
0.0321
702
0.0129
854

Average
0.1187
734
0.0580
1062
0.0234
565
0.009
626

Note: Column “Mean” measures the average penetration rate across counties, Column “N”
measures the number of counties that have MA enrollment out of 1101 MSA counties.
Source: CMS data, Medicare Advantage/Part D Contract and Enrollment data, 2006-2009.
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mortality_~e
unemployme~e
bed_rate
lnpop_dens~y
lnmedian_i~e
per_male
per_white
per_black
poverty_rate
medicaid_r~e
midwest
northeast
west
nursing
per_under12
per1519
per2024
per2544
per4564
Source: AHRF data, 2006-2009

4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851

0.0460742
5.806164
3.759325
6.801736
10.83455
0.4901084
0.779139
0.154533
13.51901
0.1498616
0.2327355
0.1894455
0.1480107
3.179169
0.1990613
0.0695888
0.069435
0.2748526
0.2550197

0.0054573
2.275088
1.827867
1.358753
0.205482
0.0105569
0.1270935
0.1256461
4.32555
0.0795238
0.4226186
0.3919025
0.3551472
1.087905
0.0248154
0.0084634
0.0144597
0.031104
0.0226514

0.033235
2.3
0
2.91235
10.3577
0.465634
0.281051
0.002864
4.1
0.030247
0
0
0
0
0.124691
0.043776
0.043085
0.191062
0.195628

0.062451
14
15.8852
11.1733
11.4601
0.524712
0.968427
0.65559
28.9
0.429532
1
1
1
5.926926
0.258699
0.091345
0.142264
0.37928
0.309481
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TABLE 4 PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS SUMMARY
Variable
obs
Age 65-69
4851
Age 70-74
4851
Age 75-79
4851
Age 80-84
4851
Male
4851
White
4851
Black
4851
Obese
4851
Underweight
4851
Excellent health condition
4851
Very good health condition
4851
Good health condition
4851
Fair health condition
4851
Smoker
4851
Hypertension
4851
Myocardial
4851
Ever told had angina pectoris 4851
Heart conditions
4851
Stroke
4851
Cancer
4851
Diabetes
4851
ADL helpers
4851
Less than high school
4851
High school
4851
Some college
4851
College
4851
Married
4851
Widowed
4851
Divorced
4851
Separated
4851
Number of children living
4851
Work
4851
Distance from hospital
4851
Risk index
4851
Case mix index
4851
DRG weights
4851
Source: MCBS claim data, 2006-2009.

mean
0.1245104
0.1535766
0.1781076
0.2236652
0.4197073
0.8499278
0.1106988
0.2510823
0.0486498
0.0414348
0.1504844
0.3073593
0.3052979
0.0808081
0.7429396
0.2292311
0.2174809
0.180169
0.1945991
0.2438672
0.312719
0.7730365
0.3230262
0.280973
0.2446918
0.151309
0.4252731
0.4458874
0.0762729
0.0098949
2.85838
0.0385488
35.99905
0.7036217
1.466282
1.553604

std
0.330197
0.3605796
0.3826427
0.4167432
0.4935618
0.3571789
0.3137912
0.4336804
0.2151569
0.1993141
0.3575825
0.4614471
0.460581
0.2725682
0.437058
0.4203815
0.4125749
0.3843678
0.3959325
0.4294578
0.4636487
0.418912
0.4676808
0.4495207
0.4299486
0.3583868
0.4944353
0.4971144
0.2654617
0.0989898
2.46115
0.1925367
188.3992
0.7778851
0.4069369
1.899402

min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

max
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
17
1
2601.94
6.525
2.62649
26.0295
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TABLE 5 HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS SUMMARY
Variable
Government owned hospital
Private hospital-for profit
Private hospital-none profit
# of staff bed
# of admission
Inpatient days (log)
# of employees
Teaching hospitals
# of birth (log)
Staffed bassinets
Emergency outpatient visits
Total outpatient visits
# of operating rooms
ICU beds
Total employee equivalent

obs
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851
4851

Source: AHA survey data, 2006-2009.

mean
0.1207998
0.14698
0.7322202
5.72986
9.608665
11.23706
7.236669
0.4627912
6.16349
2.639207
10.4265
12.04554
2.255992
2.505196
7.414616

std
0.3259281
0.3541225
0.4428479
0.7426472
0.870272
0.8514316
0.9390539
0.498665
3.085674
1.420773
2.016519
1.432899
1.226965
1.327045
0.9033796

min
0
0
0
2.079442
5.488938
6.542472
3.496508
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.060443

max
1
1
1
7.718241
11.53239
13.46453
9.77127
1
9.446361
5.003946
12.50061
14.84513
4.574711
5.278115
9.706438
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TABLE 6 MA PAYMENT RATE SUMMARY

HMO
PFFS
Local PPO
Regional
PPO

Mean
N
Mean
N
Mean
N
Mean
N

2006
649.15
752
660.20
1011
677.18
462
712.79
385

2007
687.41
762
691.84
1097
717.68
486
731.14
500

2008
697.37
806
722.66
1098
716.99
575
751.51
651

2009
712.98
832
778.73
1100
741.23
700
754.13
865

Mean
687.58
788
714.47
1077
716.50
556
742.00
600

Note: Column “Mean” measures the average payment rate in dollar from CMS across
counties, Column “N” measures the number of counties that has payment data for Part C
Plans out of 1101 MSA counties.
Source: CMS data, Medicare Advantage Plan payment data items, details for 2006-2009.
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TABLE 7 ENDOGENEITY TEST RESULTS
Value
𝛽𝑟1
𝛽𝑟2

3.275
3.567

Standard
deviation
1.129
3.032

P-value
0.004
0.240

Note: 𝛽𝑟1 is the coefficient of residual from regressing CCP penetration rate on the
instrument variables and all exogenous; 𝛽𝑟2 is the coefficient of residual from regressing
PFFS penetration rate on the instrument variables and all exogenous.
I use F-test to test the null hypothesis that both 𝛽𝑟1 =0 and 𝛽𝑟2 =0, p-value equals to
0.0033. Thus we can reject the null hypothesis, and, endogeneity does exist.
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TABLE 8 FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS
Independent Variables
Payment Rates
Payment to HMO
Payment to PFFS
Payment to Local PPO
Payment to Regional PPO
County Characteristic
Mortality Rate
Unemployment Rate
Bed Rate
Population Density (Log)
Median Household Income
Percent Of Male
Percent Of White
Percent Of Black
Poverty Rate
Medicaid Rate
Midwest
Northeast
West
# Of Skilled Nursing Facilities
% Of Population Under12
% Of Population 15-19
% Of Population 20-24
% Of Population 25-44
% Of Population 45-64
Hospital Characteristics
Private Hospital-For Profit
Private Hospital-Not For
Profit
# Of Staff Bed
# Of Admission
Inpatient Days (Log)
# Of Employees
Teaching Hospitals
# Of Birth (Log)
Staffed Bassinets
Emergency Outpatient Visits

CCP Share

HMO Share

PFFS Share

0.0000163
0.0000538
-6.95E-06
0.0000699 ***

0.0000138
0.0000707
-0.0000274
0.0000607 **

0.0000544 **
-0.0000105
-6.19E-06
1.09E-06

-2.004243
-0.0090469 **
-0.0057532
0.0108253
-0.3546022 ***
-0.7224788
0.1244474
0.1550378
-0.0047092
-0.302091 **
-0.0308311
0.1203201 ***
0.1973037 ***
0.0374035 **
0.41027
-0.4082836
0.7603183
0.4600376
1.034376

-1.521831
-0.0093525 **
-0.0056966
0.0135145
-0.2900124 ***
-0.7317879
0.092407
0.140985
-0.0033271
-0.2693379 *
-0.0242106
0.1121536 ***
0.199178 ***
0.0368966 ***
0.7150216
-1.6589
1.094993
0.183801
0.8290734

-1.560804
0.0013839
0.0017704
-0.001064
-0.0661825 **
-0.7493864
0.057716
-0.0655995
-0.0025355
0.046946
0.0289406 ***
-0.0367538 ***
-0.023272 **
-0.0165662 ***
-0.0351964
2.36565 ***
-0.680421
0.5255639 ***
0.3499746

0.0289512

0.0212583

0.0163484 **

0.0096118

0.0018352

0.0139672 **

0.0425783 **
0.0077667
-0.0209533
0.0879277 **
0.0069533
-0.0027573
0.0002138
0.0006972

0.0244508
0.0119982
-0.0080241
0.0871206 **
0.0116155
-0.0032734
0.0006958
0.0008031

-0.0180613 ***
-0.0171068 **
0.0182294 **
-0.0096697
-0.0014008
-0.0010881
0.0017353
0.002642 **
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Total Outpatient Visits
# Of Operating Rooms
ICU Beds
Total Employee Equivalent

-0.0017373
0.001544
0.0011917 **
-0.1082818 ***

-0.0021914
0.0039934
-0.0004989
-0.1083846 ***

0.0003405
0.002946
-0.002674
0.0197868 *

Patient Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

R-squared

.6043

.5960

.5320

Note: Dependent variables are CCP market share, HMO market share, and PFFS market
share, which range from 0 to 1. The model is clustered by county.
∗ Significant at 10% level.
∗∗ Significant at 5% level.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level.
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TABLE 9 MAIN REGRESSION RESULTS—30-DAY READMISSION RATE

Independent Variables
Market Penetration
CCP Share
HMO Share
PFFS Share
Patient Characteristics
Age 65-69
Age 70-74
Age 75-79
Age 80-84
Male
White
Black
Obese
Underweight
Excellent Health Condition
Very Good Health Condition
Good Health Condition
Fair Health Condition
Smoker
Hypertension
Myocardial
Ever Told Had Angina Pectoris

Heart Conditions
Stroke
Cancer
Diabetes
ADL helpers
Less Than High School
High School
Some College
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Number Of Children Living

Probit Model
Without Instruments
Model 1
Model 2

Probit Model
With Instruments
Model 3
Model 4

-0.1784 ***

-1.1324 ***

-0.0849

-0.1661 **
-0.0738

-1.1033

-1.5158 ***
-0.8012

-0.0283
0.0149
-0.0055
0.0084
0.0134
-0.0131
-0.0318
0.0244
-0.0022
-0.0843 **
-0.0855 ***
-0.0161
-0.0382 **
0.0326
0.0337 **
-0.0115
-0.0036
0.0214
-0.026
-0.002
0.0089
0.033**
-0.0076
-0.0395 *
-0.0003
0.0474
0.0507
0.0543
0.0884
0.0007

-0.0288
0.0148
-0.0057
0.0083
0.0132
-0.0128
-0.0312
0.0242
-0.0018
-0.0845 **
-0.0856 ***
-0.0163
-0.0384 **
0.0333
0.0335 **
-0.0113
-0.0039
0.0217
-0.0256
-0.0019
0.009
0.0328 *
-0.0075
-0.0396 *
-0.0003
0.0476
0.0507
0.0544
0.088
0.0006

-0.0277
0.0187
0.0045
0.0104
0.0129
-0.0164
-0.0524
0.0307 **
0.0045
-0.0875 **
-0.0837 ***
-0.0165
-0.0311 *
0.0165
0.0363 **
-0.0122
0.0029
0.0181
-0.0224
-0.0066
0.0075
0.0356 **
0.0001
-0.0327
0.00327
0.0422
0.0432
0.0532
0.0644
0.0018

-0.0321
0.0195
0.0063
0.0091
0.0116
-0.0231
-0.0642
0.0321 **
0.006
-0.0932 **
-0.0847 ***
-0.0196
-0.0302 *
0.0171
0.0363 **
-0.0114
0.0028
0.0204
-0.0183
-0.0061
0.0085
0.0348 **
0.0028
-0.0331
0.0048
0.0359
0.0352
0.0517
0.0411
0.0017
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Work
-0.0659 *
Distance From Hospital
-2.06E-05
Risk Index
0.0313 ***
Case Mix Index
0.0351
DRG Weights
0.0105 ***
Weekday
0.0162
Date Factor (Compare To 2006)
Year 2007
-0.0016
Year 2008
0.031
Year 2009
0.0097
County Characteristic
Mortality Rate
-0.0724
Unemployment Rate
-0.0001
Bed Rate
0.0005
Population Density (Log)
0.024 *
Median Household Income
-0.0934
Percent Of Male
-0.919
Percent Of White
0.2838
Percent Of Black
0.2467
Poverty Rate
-0.0062
Medicaid Rate
-0.0292
Midwest
-0.0006
Northeast
0.0058
West
0.048
# Of Skilled Nursing Facilities 0.0082
% Of Population Under12
-0.12
% Of Population 15-19
2.4535
% Of Population 20-24
-0.188
% Of Population 25-44
0.2821
% Of Population 45-64
-0.4563
Hospital Characteristics
Government Owned
-0.0269
Hospital
Private Hospital-For Profit
0.0099
# Of Staff Bed
0.0087
# Of Admission
-0.0744 **
Inpatient Days (Log)
0.0469
# Of Employees
0.113 *
Teaching Hospitals
0.0146
# Of Birth (Log)
0.0046

-0.066 *
-2.06E-05
0.0313 ***
0.0341
0.0106 ***
0.0163

-0.0674 *
-3.13E-06
0.0316 ***
0.0452 *
0.0102 ***
0.0133

-0.0668 *
5.94E-06
0.0322 ***
0.0397
0.0099 ***
0.013

-0.0022
0.0285
0.0055

0.0138
0.0823 ***
0.0895 **

0.003
0.0685 **
0.079 *

0.0925
-1.29E-05
0.0007
0.0239 *
-0.0762
-0.909
0.2747
0.2418
-0.0059
-0.0132
0.0006
0.0031
0.0461
0.0074
-0.0574
2.1754
-0.1135
0.214
-0.5111

-4.6096
-0.0048
-0.0053
0.0382 ***
-0.5042 ***
-2.0852
0.5427 *
0.4047
-0.0126 **
-0.3284 *
-0.00008
0.0882
0.2098 ***
0.0389 *
0.044
5.159
-0.135
1.362 *
0.9369

-3.8462
-0.0096
-0.0069
0.0451 ***
-0.5087 ***
-2.0255
0.555 *
0.4863
-0.0114 **
-0.3348 **
-0.0085
0.1275 **
0.2932 ***
0.0561 **
0.7836
2.1103
0.9371
0.8247
0.8423

-0.0255

-0.0481 *

-0.0351

0.0096
0.0057
-0.0735 **
0.0486
0.111 *
0.0154
0.0046

0.0346
0.034
-0.0866 **
0.0518
0.1992 ***
0.02
0.0028

0.0398
0.031
-0.0739 **
0.0603
0.2413 ***
0.0316 *
0.0024

78

Staffed Bassinets
Emergency Outpatient Visits
Total Outpatient Visits
# Of Operating Rooms
ICU Beds
Total Employee Equivalent

-0.0026
0.0045
0.0013
0.0127
-0.0059
-0.1414 **

-0.0027
0.0045
0.0013
0.013
-0.006
-0.1394 **

-0.0068
0.007
-0.0002
0.0182
-0.0095
-0.2393 ***

-0.0093
0.0066
-0.001
0.0212 *
-0.0106
-0.297 ***

Note:
1. The dependent variable is a binary variable to measure 30-day readmission: when it
equals to one, there is a readmission within 30 days; when it equals to zero, there is no
readmission within 30 days.
2. All value in the table measures marginal effect of each explaining variable.
3. The sample size is 4,851, with four-year periods.
∗ Significant at 10% level.
∗∗ Significant at 5% level.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level.
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TABLE 10 ROBUST TEST
Independent
Variables
CCP share
PFFS share
Risk Adjusters
County FEs
Hospital FEs
Year FEs

60-day Readmission
Rate
-1.0786 ***
-.7910
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

90-day Readmission
Rate
-1.1157***
.2485
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Pseudo R2

0.0347

0.037

Note:
1. The two binary variables of 60-day and 90-day readmission rates are used as quality
indicators.
2. All value in the table measures marginal effect of each explaining variable.
3. The sample sizes are 4,337 and 3,798, respectively, with four-year periods.
∗ Significant at 10% level.
∗∗ Significant at 5% level.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level.
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TABLE 11 CHRONIC CONDITIONS

Independent
Variables

Hypertension

Cancer

Stroke

Diabetes

CCP Share

-.9947 **

-3.1051 ***

-1.3804 *

-.3986

PFFS Share

-.8708

-.713

1.967545

-1.3028

Readmission Rate

26.03%

25.44%

24.15%

27.42%

Note:
1. The dependent variable is a binary variable to measure 30-day readmission: when it
equals to one, there is a readmission within 30 days; when it equals to zero, there is no
readmission within 30 days.
2. All values in the table measure the marginal effect of each explaining variable.
3. The sample sizes are 3604, 1183, 944 and 1517, respectively, with four-year periods.
∗ Significant at 10% level.
∗∗ Significant at 5% level.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level.
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TABLE 12 SELECTION BIAS TEST

Dependent Variables
Cancer
Risk
DRG weights
Stroke
Diabetes

CCP share
-.851472
(-2.59)
-.0916663
(-0.15)
.1811279
(0.12)
-.190593
(0.62)
.2944518
(0.85)

PFFS share
-.8559415
(-0.96)
1.854472
(1.61)
.4704402
(0.12)
1.405834
(1.73)
-.8761858
(-0.95)

Note:
1. The dependent variables of Cancer, Stroke, and Diabetes are binary variables, where I
use the Probit model to measure the marginal effect. The dependent variables of Risk and
DRG weights are continuous variables, where I use the OLS model to estimate the
coefficients.
2. The sample size is 4,851, with four-year periods.
3. All value in the parenthesis measures t-statistic.
∗ Significant at 10% level.
∗∗ Significant at 5% level.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level.

82

REFERENCES
Afendulis, Christopher; Michael Chernew and Daniel Kessler, 2013. The Effect of Medicare
Advantage on Hospital Admissions and Mortality. NBER Working Paper Series,
working paper 19101
Baicker, Katherine; Michael Chernew and Jacob Robbins, 2013. The Spillover Effects of
Medicare Managed Care: Medicare Advantage and Hospital Utilization. Journal of
Health Economics 32: 1289-1300
Baker, Laurence C., 1997. The Effect of HMOs on fee-for-service health care expenditures:
Evidence from Medicare. Journal of Health Economics 16: 453-481
Baker, Laurence C., and Ciaran S. Phibbs, 2002. Managed Care, Technology Adoption, and
Health Care: The Adoption of Neonatal Intensive Care. The RAND Journal of
Economics 33 (3): 524-548
Baker, Laurence C. and Martin L. Brown, 1997. The Effect of Managed Care on Health
Care Providers. NBER Working Paper No. 5987
Baker, Laurence and Susan K. Wheeler. 1998. Managed Care and Technology Diffusion:
The Case of MRI. Health Affaires 17: 195-207
Baker, Laurence C., 1999. Association of Managed Care Market Share and Health
Expenditures for Fee-for-Service Medicare Patients. The Journal of the American
Medical Association 281(5):432-437

83

Baker, Laurence C. and Mark B. McClellan, 2001. Managed Care, Health Care Quality, and
Regulation. The Journal of Legal Studies 30(2): 715-741
Baker, L.C. 2001. Managed Care and Technology Adoption in Health Care: Evidence from
Magnetic Resonance Imaging. Journal of Health Economics 20(3): 395-421
Baker, Laurence C., 2003. Managed Care Spillover Effects. Annual review of Public Health
24: 435-56
Blendon, Robert J.; Mollyann Brodie, et al. 1998. Understanding the managed care
backlash. Health Affairs 17: 80-95
Bokhari, Farasat A.S., 2009. Managed Care Competition and the Adoption of Hospital
Technology: The Case of Cardiac Catheterization. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 27: 223-237
Brunt, Christopher S. and Gail Jensen, 2012. Pricing Distortions in Medicare’s Physician
Fee Schedule and Patient Satisfaction with Care Quality and Access.
Cao, Zhun and Thomas G McGuireb, 2003. Service-level selection by HMOs in Medicare.
Journal of Health Economics 22 (6): 915–931
Carey, Kathleen and Theodore Stefos, 2011. Controlling for Quality in the Hospital Cost
Function. Health Care Manag Sci 14: 125-134

84

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Office of Public Affairs (1999). Fact Sheet:
Managed care and Medicare, Accessed 5 May 2006.
Chernew, Michael. 1995. The Impact of Non-IPA HMOs on the Number of Hospital and
Hospital Capacity. Inquiry 32: 143-54
Chernew, Michael; Philip DeCiccab and Robert Town, 2008. Managed Care and Medical
Expenditures of Medicare Beneﬁciaries. Journal of Health Economics 27: 1451–1461
Culter, D., and L. Sheiner. 1998. Managed Care and the Growth of Medical Expenditures.
In Frontiers in Health Policy Research, A.M. Garber, ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Decker, S.L., 2007. Medicaid Physician Fees and the Quality of Medical Care of Medicaid
Patients in the USA. Review of Economics of the Household 5: 95-112.
Dowd, Bryan; Matthew Maciejewski, Heidi O’Connor, et al., 2011. Health Plan Enrollment
and Mortality in the Medicare Program. Health Economics 20: 645-659
Escarce, Jose J., Arvind K. Jain and Jeannette Rogowshi, 2006. Hospital Competition,
Managed Care, and Mortality after Hospitalization for Medical Conditions: Evidence
from Three States. Medical Care Research and Review 63(6): 112S-140S
Gaskin, Darrell J. and Jack Hadley, 1997. The Impact of HMO Penetration on the Rate of
Hospital Cost Inflation, 1985—1993. Inquiry 34(3): 205-216

85

Glied, Sherry, 2000. Managed Care. In: Culyer, A.J., Newhourse, J.P. (Eds.), Handbook of
health Economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Glied, Sherry and Joshua Zivin, 2002. How Do Doctors Behave When Some (But Not All) of
Their Patients Are In Managed Care? Journal of Health Economics 21(2): 337-353
Gold, Marsha R., Robert Hurley, Timothy Lake, Todd Ensor and Berenson, Robert, 1995. A
National Survey of the Arrangements Managed-Care Plans Make With Physicians.
The New England Journal of Medicine 333(25): 1678-1683
Haire J.F. Jr., Anderson RE, Tatham RL and WC Black., 1992. Multivariate Data Analysis
with Readings. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
Hellinger, Fred J., 1998. The Effect Of Managed Care On Quality: A Review Of Recent
Evidence. Arch Intern Med 158(8):833-841
Heidenreich, P. A., M. McClellan, C. Frances, et al. 2002. The Relation between Managed
Care Market Share and the Treatment of Elderly Fee-for-Service Patients with
Myocardial Infarction. American Journal of Medicine 112(3): 176-182
Hueston W.J .and A. Sutton, 2000. Managed care market share and cesarean section rates
in the United States: is there a link? Am J Manag Care 6(11):1202-8.
Jiang H. Joanna; Bernard Friedman and Shenyi Jiang, 2013. Hospital Cost and Quality
Performance in Relation to Market Forces: An Examination of U.S. Community
Hospitals in the “Post-Managed Care Era”. Int J Health Care Finance Econ 13: 53-71

86

Kaestner, R. and J. Guardado, 2008. Medicare Reimbursement, Nurse Staffing, and
Patient Outcomes. Journal of health Economics 27: 339-361
Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF).
Changes

in

the

Explaining Health Reform:

Medicare

Advantage

Key

Program.

Available

http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8071.pdf

at

(accessed

June 1, 2013)
Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF). Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet. Available at
http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage-fact-sheet (accessed June
1, 2013)
Keating, Nancy; Mary B. Landrum, Ellen Meara, Patricia Ganz, and Edward Guadagnoli,
2005. Do Increases in the Market Share of Managed Care Influence Quality of
Cancer in the Fee-For-Service Sector? Journal of the National Cancer Institute
97(4):257-64
Litaker, David and Randall D. Cebul, 2003. Managed Care Penetration, Insurance Status,
and Access to Health Care. Med Care 41: 1086-1095
Mas, Nuria and Janice Seinfeldb, 2008. Is managed care restraining the adoption of
technology by hospitals? Journal of Health Economics 27(4): 1026-1045
McGuire, Thomas G., Joseph P. Newhouse and Anna D. Sinaiko, 2013. An Economic
History of Medicare Part C. The Milbank Quarterly 89(2): 289-332.

87

Meara, Ellen; Mary B. Landrum, John Z. Ayanian, Barbara J. McNeil and Edward
Guadagnoli. 2004. The Effect of Managed Care Market Share on Appropriate Use of
Coronary Angiography among Traditional Medicare Beneficiaries. Inquiry 41(2): 144158
MedPAC (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission). 1998. Report to the Congress:
Medicare payment policy, March. Washington, DC.
MedPAC (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission). 1999. Report to the Congress:
Medicare payment policy, March. Washington, DC.
MedPAC (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission). 2009. Report to the Congress:
Medicare payment policy, March. Washington, DC.
MedPAC (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission). 2010. Report to the Congress:
Medicare payment policy, March. Washington, DC.
MedPAC (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission). 2014. Report to the Congress:
Medicare payment policy, March. Washington, DC.
Mello, Michelle M.; Sally C. Stearns and Edward C. Norton, 2002. Do Medicare HMOs still
reduce health services use after controlling for selection bias? Health Economics, 11:
323–340

88

Mello, Michelle, Sally C. Stearns, Edward C. Norton, and Thomas C. Ricketts, 2003.
Understanding Biased Selection in Medicare HMOs. Health services research 38 (3):
961-992
Mobley, Lee R and Jon Magnussen, 2002. The impact of managed care penetration and
hospital quality on efficiency in hospital staffing. Journal of health care finance 28
(4): 24-42
Mukamel D B, J Zwanziger, and K J Tomaszewski, 2001. HMO Penetration, Competition,
and Risk-Adjusted Hospital Mortality. HRS: Health Services Research 36(6 Pt 1):
1019–1035
Nicholas, Lauren H. (2009). Medicare Advantage? The Effects of Managed Care on
Quality of Care. Population Studies Center Research Report No. 09-672
Riley, Gerald; Tudor, Cynthia; Chiang, Yen-pin; Ingber, Melvin, 1996. Health status of
Medicare enrollees in HMOs and fee-for-service in 1994. Health Care Financing
Review17 (4): 65-76.
Shen, Yu-Chu, 2002. The effect of hospital ownership choice on patient outcomes after
treatment for acute myocardial infarction. Journal of Health Economics 21(5):901922.
Shen, Y.C. and S. Zuckerman, 2005. The Effect of Medicaid Payment Generosity on Access
and Use among Beneficiaries. Health Services Research 40(3):723-744

89

Shen, Yu-Chu; Vivian Y. Wu, and Glenn Melnick, 2010. Trends in Hospital Cost and
Revenue, 1994-2005: How Are They Related to HMO Penetration, Concentration,
and For-Profit Ownership? Health Services Research 45(1): 42-61
Terza, Joseph V.; Anirban Basu, and Paul J. Rathouz, 2008. Two-stage Residual Inclusion
Estimation: Addressing Endogeneity in Health Econometric Modeling. Journal of
Health Economics 27: 531-543.
Wooldridge, J.M., 2009. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 4th edition.

90

ABSTRACT

SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS: DOES THE MARKET
PENETRATION OF PLANS AFFECT HOSPITAL CARE QUALITY?
by
QIANWEI SHEN
May 2015

Advisor: Dr. Gail Jensen Summers
Major: Economics
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
The percentage of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage (MA)
plans increased from 12 percent in 2003 to 28 percent in 2013 out of the roughly 50
million Medicare enrollees. Although Medicare beneficiaries are increasingly choosing MA
plans, little is known about whether and how the market penetration of these plans affect
the quality of hospital care provided to Medicare beneficiaries. This issue is extremely
important to policy makers when they try to evaluate the importance and effectiveness of
current Medicare policy, like the Affordable Care Act. This paper examines the spillover
effect on the quality of hospital care under traditional Medicare plans in response to the
local market penetration of MA plans, such as MA health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), MA preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and MA private fee-for-service
(PFFS) plans. Using nationally representative data from the 2006 to 2009 Medicare
Current Beneficiary Survey and enrollment data from CMS, this study shows that higher
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Medicare Advantage plan penetrations are associated with lower readmission. I conclude
that the expansion of Medicare Advantage plans has a positive spillover effect on quality
of care received by individuals enrolled in traditional Medicare plans.
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